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  During the 2008 spike in oil prices, oil companies and government officials were 
brought under close scrutiny as many Americans began to question why prices were able 
to rise so quickly.  Americans had become accustomed to living in an economy where 
cheap oil was the norm, and demanded answers when that situation changed.  What most 
of them did not know is that they were repeating history and mimicking the response to 
the 1973 oil embargo.  Just as in 2008, the United States faced a crisis in 1973 with which 
it was unprepared to effectively cope.  This thesis analyzes the reasons for a d
consequences of this lack of preparation in 1973 drawing on the writings of major policy 
makers and leaders of the time, most notably Henry Kissinger, Anwar el-Sdat, and 
Richard Nixon, Senate hearings testimony, recently declassified government documents 
detailing plans for U.S. invasion, and contemporary newspapers which recorded public 
perception.  I argue that decades of living with cheaply priced oil, an over reliance on 
multinational corporations and a lack of understanding of Middle Eastern resentment 
toward these oil companies, combined with a fundamental misunderstanding of how oil 
and politics could be linked brought the United States to the ultimate near-decision of 
invading the Middle East.  
 
The 1973 oil embargo brought the United States face-to-face with the 
consequences of reliance on foreign oil and with the hardships that resulted from it.  The 
United States had relied on oil companies to manage their interests in the Middle East for 
decades but in 1973 the situation changed forever.  I close by considering the ongoing 
deep ties between the United States and the Middle East that are present still.  The same 
problems that existed in 1973 exist today, and until those are corrected the United States 





Introduction: “To the detriment of both our economy and our 
security” 1 
 
Crisis On The Doorstep 
On October 17, 1973, President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger, met with the foreign ministers of four Arab countries.  Led by the Saudi 
Foreign Minister, Omar Saqqaf, the Arab statesmen discussed their concerns about the 
ongoing war between Israel and several Arab states.  Both parties discussed common 
ground and President Nixon pledged that he would work and exert his influence in order 
to carry out United Nations Resolution 242, a resolution passed following the Six Day 
War in 1967 after Israel defeated its Arab neighbors that called for Israel to return to its 
pre-1967 war borders.  They also discussed the U.S. airlift of supplies to Israel during the 
current Yom Kippur War between Israel and several Arab nations led by Egypt and 
Syria, which Nixon stressed was not anti-Arab in nature.  Finally, Nixon offered 
Kissinger to act as lead negotiator between Israel and the Arabs in order to each a 
ceasefire.  After the meeting, which was deemed cordial and productive by the 
Americans, Kissinger remarked to his staff that he did not think that the Arab countries 
would use their valuable resource, oil, as leverage against the United States.2   
Halfway around the world, another meeting took place at the same time.  The 
members of OAPEC, the Arab countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) plus Egypt and Syria, had assembled to discuss strategy.  Gathered in 
Kuwait City, the Arab oil ministers were contemplating using their oil as a weapon in 
                                                
1 Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped (New York: 
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their war.  However, this weapon would not be used against their adversary Israel, but 
against those countries that supported Israel, particularly the United States.  A plan was 
proposed by Iraq, one of the most radical Arab nations in that they were critical of the 
economic ties between other Arab nations and the West, which would declare all-out 
economic warfare on the United States.  This proposal included nationalizing all 
American-owned businesses in the Arab world, withdrawing all Arab deposits from 
American banks, and cutting off all oil shipments to the United States and any other 
country that supported Israel.  The other Arab nations resisted this plan, believing it was 
too extreme and would severely jeopardize their economies, and instead settled on a 
modified embargo under which they would cut production five percent from the level 
produced in September.  Following that cut, supplies would be reduced an additional five 
percent every month until Israel returned to its pre-1967 war borders.  All of the paries 
present adopted a secret resolution that declared that the United States should be 
subjected to the most drastic cuts with the end result being the total stoppage of oil 
shipments to the U.S. by all of the nations present.  The embargo was officially 
announced by OAPEC on October 17, 1973.3 
The embargo was a very shrewd plan.  If one country in particular had been 
embargoed and its oil supplies cut off, oil from non-OPEC countries could be diverted to 
make up for the shortages, exactly as had been done when oil embargoes had been 
implemented by Arab nations in 1956 and by OPEC in 1967.  However, if the total 
supply of oil on the market was reduced, and then different amounts were sold to 
different nations, prices would rise and uncertainty would prevail around the world.  If 
the prospect of continued cutbacks loomed and shortages persisted, rivalries would 
                                                




develop between countries as they sought to secure oil for themselves, even if it meant
forsaking their allies.  From the beginning, therefore, OAPEC sought to divide the 
industrialized nations and turn them against one another.  With the cutbacks in place and 
the commitments of the oil-producing nations to maintain the embargo, the oil crisis had 
begun.4   
 The story of how the United States found itself in this predicament in 1973 began 
over one hundred years before.  From the humble beginnings of the oil industry in the 
United States in the 1870s through its expansion to a multibillion-dollar industry by the 
middle of the 20th century, oil had become one of the most prized resources on the planet.  
It became the fuel of choice for the world’s industries as well as the reason so much 
attention was focused on the Middle East, where oil reserves abounded.  By 1973, the 
United States had become reliant on cheap imported oil from the Middle East for the 
continuation of it economic growth, and when the supplies were cut off with the 
embargo, the United States was left unprepared to deal with the crisis that it left in its 
wake.  They were now faced with an embargo that could severely jeopardize its intere ts 
both domestically and internationally, and, as oil officials claimed, act, “to the detriment 
of both our economy and our security.”5  The United States scrambled to change the 
situation that years of complacency towards the Middle East had created.  No option was 
off the table for dealing with embargo, even armed invasion at a time when confidence in 
the military was badly shaken due to the Vietnam War.  The range of options considered 
reveals just how completely the United States was caught off guard by the embargo, and 
how mightily they had to struggle to cope with it. 
                                                
4 Ibid., 608. 




Why was the United States so unprepared to deal with an oil shutoff?  It certainly 
should not have been, as it was no secret that the U.S. was meeting its energy needs by
depending on ever-increasing amounts of imported oil, oil that was controlled largely by 
OPEC.  OPEC, which had been dismissed by U.S. policymakers at its inception because 
they believed the oil-exporters could never organize or survive without western markets, 
had steadily grown in power and confidence since the mid-1960s as they took greater 
control of the oil supply.  Even with the emergence of OPEC as a force capable of 
blocking oil shipments, the United States largely ignored the problem.  They believed the 
Middle East and the Arab countries could be controlled as they always had been by a 
combination of the business dealings by the major oil companies such as Exxon and 
Shell, and U.S. pressure, economic, diplomatic, and if necessary, military.   
However well U.S. policy had succeeded in maintaining the oil supply before 
1973, it failed when the Yom Kippur War erupted.  It failed due to many reasons, 
including the heavy-handed practices of large oil companies and the backlash it caused,
an over dependence in the U.S. economy on imported oil, the refusal by the government 
to take OPEC seriously or act as a check to its growing power, the lack of a cohesive and 
comprehensive energy plan, faulty intelligence leading up to the war, the lack of foresight 
by U.S. policymakers as to the way in which politics and oil could be effectively linked, 
and the belief that the United States could always enforce its will in the Middle East.  
These mistakes caused great confusion and hardship for the American people, and forced 
them to deal with the reality that even as a superpower, the United States was tied to 
developments in a region halfway around the world, and that the cheap oil that they had 





Chapter 1:“American oil companies are, for all practical purposes, 
instruments of our foreign policy.”1 
 
Keepers of the Oil 
 
The intersection of the energy needs of the United States and politics in the 
Middle East had its beginning in the late 19th century as oil came into prominence and the 
public mindset when it was found to be useful as both a lubricant and as a source of light.  
As time passed and its advantages over coal as a brighter and cleaner illuminant became 
more widely known, oil wells were dug in Pennsylvania and Ohio.  Oil, and particularly 
kerosene, became a cheap and easily transported source of illumination for the country.  
In the 1870s, the Standard Oil Company under John D. Rockefeller grew into the 
powerful entity that effectively controlled all aspects of the oil business in the United 
States.  Standard Oil devoured its rivals and soon came to be synonymous with the 
exploration, drilling, refinement, transportation, and sale of oil to the American public.2  
Across the ocean, two major companies came to dominate the oil business in Europe; the 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and the Shell Transport and Trading Company both out 
of the Netherlands.3 
 Standard Oil operated without government restrictions until 1890 when the United 
States government passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, which struck at the heart of 
Standard Oil’s monopoly of the oil business.  After years of litigation, the U.S. Supreme 
Court broke up the company in 1911 into thirty-four independent companies, several of 
which merged and became heavyweights in the industry.4  The most powerful of the spin-
offs, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of New York, Standard Oil of California, 
                                                
1 Ibid., 148. 
2 Ibid., 28-29.  
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Gulf Oil, and Texaco, along with the British Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Royal 
Dutch Shell (after the two independent companies merged), became known as the Seven 
Sisters.  Collectively, the Sisters controlled the vast majority of the oil business 
worldwide and became the intermediaries between the producing nations and the 
consuming nations throughout the twentieth century.  They wielded enormous power on 
the prices and availability of oil globally, and became some of the wealthiest companies 
in the world.5  These companies effectively controlled the Middle East and the oil 
business with the approval of Western democracies, until their heavy-handed tactics led 
the region to rebel by forming its own cartel.6 
Oil and the Military  
 
 The true importance of oil became more apparent to world policymakers near the 
turn of the twentieth century as oil emerged as a more mainstream source of fuel f r
naval vessels.  Some men in Britain, most notably Sir Marcus Samuel the founder of 
Shell, began agitating for the British Navy to switch from coal-burning ships to oil-
burners.  Many naval officers were skeptical of Samuel, who they suspected of being 
more interested in profit than in the improvement of the navy, and were especially 
concerned because, as of 1900, no oil had been discovered within the British Empire.  
They feared a switch to oil, without a secure source of it, would put the British Navy at 
the mercy of its suppliers.  This was in stark contrast to the plentiful coal reserves that 
were found in the British Isles.  However, as the advantages of oil over coal became more 
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pronounced as a naval fuel, and oil reserves were discovered in the British territory of 
Burma, the navy converted its fleet to oil in 1910.7    
 Winston Churchill was one of the first politicians who saw the vital importance of 
oil, and he set about attempting to secure a supply of it when he was appointed First Lord 
of the Admiralty in 1911.  Shell tried to win over his favor, but failed when the British 
public grew outraged over the rising price of gasoline, now in greater demand with the 
arrival of automobiles.  Samuel and the Shell leaders tried to explain the increases as the 
product of market forces, but Churchill became suspicious and blamed the oil monopolies 
as secretly rigging prices.8  This incident proved to be one of the first cases in the world 
where the securing of adequate oil reserves and the availability of it at a re sonable price 
became a political issue, a trend that would continue indefinitely. 
 Churchill became enamored with a burgeoning company, the Anglo-Persian oil 
company, which would later become known as British Petroleum.  The company had vast 
oilfields in the Middle East, and Churchill immediately recognized the value of a 
company with large resources that could be influenced by the British government. He 
pushed through an agreement in the spring of 1914 where the British government would 
buy a 51% stake in Anglo-Persian.  Churchill appeared before Parliament in June 1914 to
justify his decision.  He stated in his jingoistic speech that the world’s oil supplies were 
dominated by two powers, Standard Oil and Shell (despite the fact that Standard Oil had 
been broken up three years prior) and that those monopolies threatened the supply of oil 
available to the British people.  The only way still available was to invest in a company 
                                                
7 Oil-burning ships offered a higher rate of speed, greater steaming radius, easier refueling, reduced boiler 
room manpower, and greater battle efficiency than coal-burning ships did. See: 
John A. DeNovo, “Petroleum and the United States Navy before World War I,” Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review Vol. 41, No. 4 (1955): 645. 




that could protect the interests of the British, and the best viable option was to have the 
British government control an organization that had large reserves, which could insulate 
the British Empire against unfair pricing by other oil sellers, such as Shell.9  Churchill 
characterized the conversion to oil-burning vessels and therefore the need for an 
uninterrupted oil supply, as involving Britain’s “national safety as much as battle at sea.  
It was as anxious and harassing as any hazard in war.”10  Oil had become a full-fledged 
political issue with the introduction of a world power having a controlling interes  in an 
oil company.   
 The British thus acted quickly to solve their oil supply problem.  Other countries, 
including the United States, did not act with the same impetus.  Many of the larger navies 
had followed Britain’s lead and converted their fleets, but few had addressed the question 
of fuel supply.  When war broke out in the summer of 1914, revolutionary weapons such 
as the tank, truck, and airplane played decidedly larger roles than had been anticipated.  
This, along with the use of naval vessels, sparked the world’s interest in petroleum, its 
uses and its supply, in a world that was increasingly based on the oil-combustion engine.  
The attainment of oil became a focal problem for the world’s industrialized nations.11  
 As the Great War dragged on, all of the Western governments were hit by the fact 
that oil was a necessity for survival.  As Georges Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of 
France for the latter part of the war, put it, “Oil is as necessary as blood.”12  Ferdinand 
Foch, the French military leader, echoed his sentiment, “We must have oil or we shall 
                                                
9 Ibid., 61-62. 
10 John A. DeNovo, “Petroleum and the United States Navy before World War I,” Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review Vol. 41, No. 4 (1955): 655. 
11 Ibid., 655-56. 




lose the war.”13  Britain’s Foreign Secretary after the war, Lord George Curzon, summed 
up the Allied triumph, “The Allies floated to victory on a wave of oil.”14  This was 
entirely true.  Germany was desperately short of oil throughout the war, but the Allies 
never faced that burden.  Britain had access to oil from BP in Persia and Shell from wells 
in Mexico and the East Indies.  America, however, was the greatest oil supplier.  Some 80 
percent of the Allied oil supplies came from the U.S., and a quarter of all Allied oi came 
from one company, Exxon.15 
Eyes on the Middle East 
 
 After the war, new problems arose.  There was a new rush of oil consumption, 
especially in the United States, where automobiles were becoming more abundant and 
construction was engineered on the foundation of cheap oil.  Travel was cheap, electricity 
was inexpensive, and the cost of heating one’s home fell, and this trend came to be 
regarded as essential for what came to be widely thought of “the American lifestyle.”  
This boom in consumption led to fears of a worldwide oil shortage, and both Americans 
and Europeans scrambled to secure new sources of it.  There was competition and 
bitterness between the former Allies, as Britain and France were determined to keep the 
United States out of the Middle East’s supplies.  The United States, though, believed that 
their assistance in winning the war entitled them to some of the spoils, and the State 
Department backed the claims and stakes of the U.S. oil companies abroad.  This close 
association led many critics to believe that the oil companies were operating on their own 
with the support of the government and that the State Department had washed its hands 
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of oil diplomacy and left it all to the corporations.16  This was true in a sense.  The U.S. 
government did not want to intrude on the business interests of oil companies and set up 
their own organizations.  They preferred to use the companies at a safe distance, and as a
State Department report wrote, “American oil operations are, for all practical purposes, 
instruments of our foreign policy toward these countries.”17  This allowed the United 
States government to have continued access to the oil but also to keep their hands clean 
of any problems the oil companies might involve themselves in.  Although the British 
government had ostensibly closer ties to their oil companies, they too steered as clear  
they could from controversies arising from oil supplies.  This led the heads of British oil 
companies, as well as American companies, to have a greater, and freer hand in setting 
foreign policy.18   
 Over the next four decades, the Seven Sisters and their supporting governments 
focused much of their attention on controlling the vast oil reserves in the Middle East.  
The former Ottoman Empire was the first to be divided up, and the British and BP moved 
quickly to secure a lucrative concession in the newly formed country of Iran.  In addition, 
the new government in Iraq reluctantly signed an agreement granting oil rights to t e Iraq 
Petroleum Company, a conglomerate of both British and American companies.19  The 
biggest prize, though, was in the remote deserts of Arabia, a place few Westerners had 
ever visited.  In Saudi Arabia, King Ibn Saud was in desperate need of money.  He 
approached several of the Sisters looking to sell concessions in his kingdom, but all 
displayed little interest because of a world oil glut on the market.  Standard Oil of 
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California, or Socal, however, leapt at the opportunity.  Socal had not joined into the 
conglomerates that were drilling in Iran and Iraq, and they teamed with Texaco to create 
an all-American operation that was to dominate the reserves of Saudi Arabia.  They 
received lucrative concessions in exchange for close dealings with the King, ensuring 
wealth for all of the parties.  Over time this shifted the balance of power in the Middle 
East and the two companies acted, without the appearance of U.S. government officials, 
as a type of quasi-government that dealt directly with a foreign sovereign government.20 
 When the Sisters and their supporting governments moved into the Middle East, 
they acted with little regard for the sovereign governments or the people they dealt with.  
The companies’ extracted lucrative concessions by threatening to have their supporting 
Western governments impose economic or political sanctions against them.  The 
governments in the Middle East were generally weak and disorganized because of their 
newfound independence, and the companies used that to their utmost advantage.  In 
return for a pittance of the extracted wealth, the ruling governments were maintained as 
long as they cooperated with the oil companies, and when they did not they were 
undermined and replaced.  Such was the case of Iran in 1951 when the nationalistic 
leader Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq overthrew the Western-friendly Shah Mohammed Rezi 
Pahlavi.  When Mossadeq inhibited the access of the oil companies to petroleum, the 
companies turned to the American and British governments for help.  Conscious of the 
problems that an interrupted oil flow might cause, the Americans and British supported 
and sanctioned a coup to overthrow Mossadeq and replace him with the Shah in August 
1953.21  The oil companies benefited greatly by arrangements such as this, and their 
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backing governments were paid in the security that came with uninterrupted oil reserves, 
something that would prove invaluable to industrialized nations as they attempted to 
grow economically. 
The Middle Eastern countries, and especially the citizens who were not receiving 
any of the wealth that was being pumped out of their nations, were less enthusiastic.  
They viewed the oil companies and the governments with contempt and bitterness, a fact 
that would have grave consequences in the following decades.  Daniel Yergin 
summarizes the feeling that was prevalent in Iran,  
Only one thing really united the country- hatred of foreigners and, in particular, 
the British.  Never had so much malevolence been attributed to a so rapidly 
declining power.  The English were regarded as almost supernatural devils, 
controlling and manipulating the entire nation...the detestation centered, in 
particular, on the largest industrial employer in Iran, the major source of the
nation's foreign earnings, and the all-too-tangible symbol of the intrusion of the
modern foreign world- the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.22    
 
Anger at the exploitation and lack of authority over their natural resource led to Iranians 
supporting Mossadeq’s nationalization and the Libyans to support Qaddafi’s 
nationalization in 1969.23  The anger boiled over across the Middle East in 1973 when the 
Arab members of OPEC decided that they would no longer be beholden in any way to the 
oil companies who had robbed them for so long. 
The Western governments who supported the Sisters in their domination of the 
Middle East, especially the United States, set a dangerous precedent by giving the oil 
companies almost complete authority to deal with the region.  By handing over 
responsibility, the countries hoped to avoid any of the negative consequences that may 
come with unpopular foreign policy decisions.  The most important aspect to the 
                                                
22 Yergin, Prize, 451. 




governments, though, was the continued supply of oil originating in the Middle East and 
flowing to the West.  The oil companies seemed to provide the perfect solution- an 
uninterrupted oil flow without the political fallout and companies who would act as 
proxies for the governments.  In return, all the oil companies asked for was a show of 
force, political, military, or economic, from time to time.  The governments believed that 
the oil companies could deal with any difficulties in the region, something at which they 
were very effective until the 1960s, when their power and control ebbed.  However, by 
separating themselves from events in the region, the Western governments lost the ability 
to immediately assess and deal with potential dangerous situations to Western interests.  
When the oil companies’ authority waned and OPEC took over in 1973, the Western 
governments stubbornly insisted on believing that the oil companies were still in control, 
which left them unprepared for the oil embargo in October 1973.24 
                                                
24 “J.J. Johnston Letter to ARAMCO Executives, June 1, 1973” contained in: 
“Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy” Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st session, 
Committee on Foreign Relations- Senate subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. (Washington D.C.: 





Chapter 2:“We attached little importance to [OPEC] because 
we believed it would not work.”1 
 
Organized Opposition: OPEC 
 
 Middle Eastern countries, on occasion, did try to alter the system that took the 
majority of their wealth outside their borders.  In 1951, Iran was the world’s largest 
exporter of oil, producing nearly 700,000 barrels per day.  Caught up in a wave of 
nationalism, Dr. Mossadeq declared, “The source of all the misfortunes of this tortured 
nation is the oil company.”2  Iran's parliament voted to nationalize its oil supplies, based 
on the belief that the world could not operate without its oil, and that it could obtain a 
larger share of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) than the fifty percent it currently 
controlled.  They were caught up in the delusion that they could set the terms of the 
nationalization because they controlled the coveted oil.3 However, there were more than 
adequate amounts of oil for sale on the open market to meet world demand, and Iran 
found itself excluded from oil sales.4  As a result of their dispute with the AIOC over 
compensation issues, Iran was forced to halt all production until they settled with the 
AIOC for a forty percent stake, far less than the Iranians had hoped.5   
 In the years following World War II, new discoveries in South America and the 
Soviet Union created a glut on the oil market that lasted through the 1960s.  The Sisters,
though, were able to maintain the price of oil, and their profits, through collusion in 
regulating production rates.  A soft market continued, and it became evident that the 
companies would have to cut production in order to stop the price of oil from bottoming 
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3 Ibid., 453-456. 
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out.  When this occurred, the revenues of the oil-producing nations were severely 
reduced.  It was in this climate in 1960 that Venezuela, which had been hit twice by 
production cuts levied by the oil companies, tried to organize the oil producers so that 
they could collectively stand against those oil company practices that they deeme  unfair.  
In September 1960, OPEC was born and a new entity entered the oil business. 
 At first, OPEC members did not have much influence over prices because the 
continuing glut produced a buyer’s market.  The glut would remain for several more 
years, during which it seemed as if the oil companies retained all of the control ove  oil 
and the markets.  However, the idea behind OPEC, that oil-producers should have control 
over their own resource, would remain powerful.6   
One of the major failings of the U.S. government’s Middle East policy was in 
their dismissive attitude towards OPEC at its beginning.  Frankly put, the U.S. lacked 
concern about OPEC and did not recognize the power it could possess.  The organization 
was seen as inherently weak because of the perceived competition among its members.  
Eisenhower, President during OPEC’s formation, was clear in his belief that the 
Organization could easily be broken.  In a National Security Council meeting, he was 
reported to have stated that, “As far as the Middle Eastern countries in the new 
Organization were concerned, anyone could break up the Organization by offering five 
cents more per barrel for the oil of one of the countries.”7  The government afforded little 
respect to the unity and resolve of OPEC, an attitude that would continue throughout the 
1960s.  
                                                
6 Ibid., 519, 522-525. 
7 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 460th Meeting of the National Security Council,” in Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula (Washington 




Conversely, the oil companies were quick in their expression of concern about 
OPEC.  OPEC posed a threat to their dominance and profits, and high-ranking oil 
company officials were asking the U.S. government to intervene within a month of 
OPEC’s emergence.  Leo Welch, chairman of the board for Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
went to the State Department on October 19, 1960, to convince the U.S. to act on the oil 
companies’ behalf.  Welch tried to convince the U.S. government that it was in their own 
best interest to urge OPEC nations to slow down the process of completing the 
organization and implementation of production cuts, because it would weaken Western 
security by limiting strategic access to oil.  His plan was to attempt to convince the Arab 
countries that oil company price cuts had not lowered their revenues, that future increases 
in world demand would blunt any decrease in revenues, and that if organization was 
pursued further, consuming countries might begin cooperating to block OPEC’s power. 
It is clear, however, that Welch had more on his mind that the interests of the 
United States.  He recognized that if OPEC could determine prices, amounts of oil 
produced, and where oil was shipped it would severely hinder the oil companies’ 
operations.  In addition, it had the potential to take away their control over the petroleum 
business, as well as possibly forcing them into a position where they could be caught 
between oil producer controls and the demands of the consuming countries.  Welch 
recognized that OPEC had the potential to drastically change the oil business landscape, 
and correctly predicted that oil companies would be caught between producers and 
consumers in a crisis, which occurred in 1973.  Despite his warnings, the U.S. 




infancy, choosing instead to attempt to preserve the status quo.8  The U.S. could have 
persuaded the oil companies to refuse to deal with the OPEC members until they 
dissolved the Organization or used some other means to pressure the breakup of the 
Organization, but they did not do it while OPEC was disorganized and still vulnerable.  
This cartel had the ability to gain power and momentum as it owned the majority of the 
world's reserves for a resource that had no viable alternatives, but the United States did 
not recognize OPEC's potential.  As Howard Page of Standard Oil said of the new 
organization, “We attached little importance to it because we believed it would n t 
work.”9 
Rise of OPEC: The Six Day War and Libyan Revolution 
 
Significant changes in the world economy during the 1960s strengthened OPEC.  
Oil demand worldwide rose faster than expected as Europe converted its industries from 
coal to oil at a quicker rate than predicted.  Also, the world’s leading consumer, the 
United States, increased demand for energy, particularly petroleum, buoyed by cheap oil 
prices.  Third World countries were increasing consumption as well.  These factors led to 
the end of the oil glut by 1970.  The market had now transitioned to one where the sellers 
had more authority, and it enabled the producers to seize more control in setting prices 
from the oil companies. 
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The Six Day War- The First Embargo 
Although OPEC gained strength with the rise in prices, there were two events that 
made it fully realize the power it possessed.  The Six Day War in June 1967 between the 
Arabs and Israelis set off a chain of events that would have far reaching repercussions.  
During the first three days of the conflict, Israel pre-emptively attacked Egypt and 
Jordan, fearing the mass mobilization of their military forces around Israel'  border.  
They succeeded in destroying much of the military capabilities of Egypt and Jordan, and 
conquered vast stretches of territory in the Sinai Peninsula.  Arab oil ministers, wishing to 
help their Arab neighbors and also quell rising nationalistic sentiments in their own 
countries (some nationalists sabotaged oil facilities as a way of striking back at the West), 
imposed an oil embargo on the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, 
threatening the oil companies if their Arab oil reached Western lands.  Their threats were 
not specifically spelled out, but they implied nationalization of petroleum installations, or 
total embargoes.10 
When the first major Arab embargo hit the West, the United States’ attention was 
focused elsewhere.  Due to the deteriorating situation in Vietnam, American 
policymaking in the Middle East took on an ad hoc quality.  The solution conjured by the 
Department of the Interior, which had jurisdiction over most federal oil issues, was to 
activate the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee.  This was the same committee that 
had been convened during the Iranian nationalization crisis in the early 1950s and again 
during the Suez Crisis in 1956-57.  The committee was constituted of representatives of 
two dozen oil companies, who issued a request to have antitrust laws suspended so that 
they could jointly manage logistics and oil shipments.  The U.S. Justice Department 
                                                




capitulated, giving the oil companies’ free reign to deal with Middle East problems in 
their own way.11  Yet again, the U.S. government’s response to Arab oil problems was to 
allow the oil companies to operate independently of the government. 
The embargo was over mere weeks after it was imposed, due to several factors.  
First, oil companies had successfully diverted oil from non-Arab sources, weakening the 
impact on the embargo targets.  Second, as tensions calmed in the Middle East and full 
production resumed, it became clear that oil reserves in the United States and Venezuela 
could, at least temporarily, make up the shortfall of Arab oil.  Finally, the biggest losers 
in the embargo seemed to be the ones who had instituted it.  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, 
and Iraq, leaders of the embargo, gave up large amounts of potential revenues in return 
for nothing, as neither Israel nor the West bowed to their wishes.  Even though the 
embargo was a complete failure in 1967, as it did not result in the desired objective of 
helping Egypt and Jordan win the Six Day War, it nonetheless proved that collective 
action using the weapon of oil could be achieved.12 
The U.S. government continued its trend of failing to recognize potential 
problems by learning too much from the 1967 embargo.  The over reliance on oil 
companies to solve Middle East oil problems worked in this case, and the U.S. kept 
believing that oil companies could act as effective proxies in the region.  Sincethe 
embargo was quickly resolved, there was no public outcry and no lasting bitterness that 
might force preparations for a greater embargo in the future.  Also, the Arab countries 
ended up being hurt the most by the embargo, further reinforcing the belief that the oil 
producers were needier of the consuming nations than they were of the Arabs.  This was 
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most clearly demonstrated in August 1967, when the Arab countries increased oil 
production in a desperate attempt to make up lost revenues and retain market share.  This 
produced a glut in the market, lowering prices.  A Wall Street Journal headline in 
October summed up, to Americans, what happened when embargoes were imposed, 
reading, “Shortage Fears Raised by Mideast War Yield to Threat of New Glut.”13  All of 
this led to the idea that Arab oil embargoes were not significant threats and could be 
easily overcome in the future, a belief that caused the U.S. to be unprepared for the 1973 
embargo.  As Frank Zarb, the future energy czar and the Assistant Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget during the 1973 oil embargo phrased it; “The impact of the 
earlier disruptions was negligible, leaving the United States with a residue of 
overconfidence and absolutely no experience to deal with the events of 1973.”14 
Radical Takeover- The Libyan Revolution 
 
 Another great awakening for OPEC came as a result of the Six Day War.  When
the war began and the Egyptians closed the Suez Canal, there was a tanker shortage.  This 
shortage brought increased demand for Libya’s oil, because their ships did not have to 
pass through the canal.  In addition, Libya’s oil was highly valued for its low sulfur 
content, making it easier to refine.  Because of this, Libya demanded more money for its 
oil.  The negotiations between Libya and the oil companies began in September 1969, but 
very shortly after, a group of military officers under Colonel Muammar Qaddafi seized 
power.15  
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 Most oil-producing nations were run by conservative governments whose desire 
for increased oil revenues were balanced by their dependence on democracies fo  
protection from internal and external threats.  This was not the case with Qaddafi.  He 
dreamed of being the leader of the Arab world, and modeled his life after his hero, 
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, who preached Arab unity under the banner of 
Islam.  Since the oil companies and the Western interests in Libya were not Muslim, he 
set out to get the most he could from the West.  To accomplish this, Qaddafi and the 
Libyans targeted Occidental Petroleum, a smaller company that was not part f the 
Sisters.  Occidental also had few sources of oil outside of Libya, so they wer  particularly 
vulnerable to changes in supply initiated by Libya.  Libya threatened to nationalize 
Occidental’s operations and cutback production unless they received higher revenues.  
Occidental, for its part, did what it could to resist this dilemma by seeking other sources 
of crude from the major suppliers.  However, the majors refused, a decision that would 
haunt them in the years ahead.  Left without alternatives, Occidental agreed in August 
1970 to give Libya a 20 percent increase in profits.  In addition, Libya succeeded in 
receiving annual price increases for their oil.16  In its negotiations with the Sisters, Libya 
pushed the envelope and demanded far-reaching control of the oil companies operating 
inside the country.  While the majors were able to resist, it foreshadowed the increasing 
demands that all the OPEC nations, not only Libya, would raise in the future.17  By 
December, all of the other oil companies, including the Sisters, agreed to terms with 
Libya. 
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 With Qaddafi’s takeover, new problems arose for the United States government.  
The U.S. had a sprawling military complex in Libya, the Wheelus Air Base.  When 
Qaddafi came to power, he asked the U.S. to vacate the country.  The U.S. government 
judged the air base to be of only marginal significance, not worth the risk of interrupting 
access to oil and jeopardizing the security of interests of American companies in L bya.  
The best course of action, the Washington Special Actions Group, an interagency 
government think tank, decided, was one of a conciliatory nature toward Qaddafi.  They 
believed that the energy supplies would only be jeopardized if Qaddafi were antagonized 
by U.S. policies that ran contrary to his rule, such as resisting his takeover of th  Wheelus 
base.  The return to the nation’s balance of payments and the security of U.S. investments 
in oil were considered greater than the presence of the military base.  Whilethey wanted 
to keep the base, in the government’s opinion it was not worth the economic loss that 
would accompany a confrontation with the Libyan government, and therefore they 
vacated Wheelus and lost a key opportunity to separate issues of diplomacy and oil.18 
 The U.S. government was passive in its reaction towards Qaddafi’s coup choosing 
not to attempt to maintain its air base, but the Western European countries reacted 
differently.  European nations were much more dependent on imported oil than the 
United States, as 60 percent of their energy was based on oil, and almost the entire 
amount imported.  Fully 25 percent of Europe’s energy needs were met by one supplier- 
Libya.  Western Europe quickly concluded the best course of action was to make peace 
with Qaddafi and deal with him.  Within four months of Qaddafi taking command, 
France agreed to sell 100 advanced jet aircraft to Libya.  Although Libya promised not to 
send the jets to the countries that surrounded Israel, the promise was transparently 
                                                




unenforceable, as Libya had few pilots even capable of flying the planes.  Other countries 
followed France’s lead, and the Federal Republic of Germany also developed cls  ties 
with Qaddafi.19   
 According to Henry Kissinger, the entire episode with Libya taught the leaders of 
oil-producing nations valuable lessons.  They learned that industrialized democracies 
would not seek to protect Western-friendly governments when they were threatened from 
internal turmoil as long as their avowedly radical successors did not challenge th ir 
access to oil.  In addition, they learned there was no point in currying favor by keeping 
prices low because the West would not protect them from insurrections and therefore 
they had the incentive to raise prices and increase their wealth while in power.20 
Host governments discovered that they had the power to control the destiny of 
their oil in the production process from start to finish, with the authority coming in three 
stages.  First, they could increase prices slowly, but steadily.  Second, they could initiate 
a de facto takeover of ownership and operational control from the oil companies without 
interference from the Western governments.  Third, the producers had the ability to link 
the sale of their oil to political conditions, as they could demand political action in retur
for uninterrupted access to their oil.21   
A Change in Priorities: Teheran and Participation 
 
 Libya’s coup over the Western governments and the oil companies came at a time 
of increased demand for oil and further pushed prices upward. There were problems with 
the pipeline in Saudi Arabia, which put a premium on ‘short-haul’ crude, oil that 
originated or was easily transported to ports on the Mediterranean Sea.  With the 
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increased demand, OPEC changed its tactics for dealing with pricing issues in th ir
negotiations with oil companies.  Up until this point, OPEC had acted only in the 
interests of maintaining prices, but now they changed to a more active role in det rmining 
price in conjunction with the oil companies.  OPEC resolved to enter into collective 
negotiations with the companies so that the tax ratios could be amended upwards, posted 
prices could increase substantially in correlation with market forces, and the discounts 
and rebates enjoyed by the companies could be completely eliminated.22    
 By negotiating jointly, OPEC was able to conclude the Tehran and Tripoli 
Agreements with the oil companies in February 1971.  This was, in essence, a new 
pricing agreement that was to be effective until 1975, giving the producers a higher price 
for their oil, a greater percentage of the oil sales revenues returned to the producers, and a 
commitment to further price increases.23  However, it represented much more than that.  
To OPEC members, it was the first step in turning the sovereignty of their natural 
resources back to the countries themselves.  They had demanded that the oil companies 
deal with them collectively or face unified price increases, without the permission of the 
oil companies.  Fadhil al-Chalabi, the Under-Secretary of Oil in Iraq, summed up what 
Tehran meant, “It was a real turning point for OPEC.  After the Tehran Agreement, 
OPEC got muscles.”24  The initiative had passed from the oil companies to the oil 
producers, and power shifted toward the OPEC members.  OPEC further backed its 
newfound power with the threat that a far-reaching embargo could be ordered if the oil 
companies failed to live up to their agreement.  This was the first widespread and 
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collective threat of using oil as a weapon, as opposed to the poorly organized embargo of 
1967, although at this point it was meant as a deterrent to economic actions, not political 
ones.25   
 At this same time, some of the oil-producers were moving toward ownership of 
their reserves.  Previously, the companies had owned the resources through the 
concession agreements.  Now, however, there was a greater push toward nationalization 
as the OPEC nations came to believe that they should receive more benefit from their 
resource and wanted greater authority over the companies within their borders.  This push 
rightly frightened the oil companies, as they were faced with the total loss of control in 
the region and also their investment and access to the precious oil.  Other countries, sch 
as politically moderate Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, lessened the 
nationalistic rhetoric and proposed ‘participation’, a scheme developed by the Saudi 
petroleum minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani.  In this plan, nations would distance themselves 
from the negative political connotations of nationalization and the prospect of oil-
producers competing with each other by buying into the oil companies and maintaining 
equity in them.  By doing this, the nations would not disrupt market stability but still have 
a pronounced effect on prices.  Participation was abhorrent to the oil companies, but 
faced with the prospect of nationalization, they were forced to accept the plan.26
 The rise of OPEC therefore marked a profound shift in the power structure in the 
Middle East.  Instead of having oil companies, backed by the Western democracies, 
operating with a free hand and exploiting the suppliers who were dependent on them, the 
producers now would have a larger role in determining the prices received for their oil.  
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The United States missed vital opportunities to blunt OPEC’s power during its early 
years, as it chose instead to distance itself as a method of maintaining the status quo and 
keeping the oil flowing.  The inaction by the United States and the cooperation of 
Western Europe toward Libya when Qaddafi gained power and used Libya’s oil re erves 
to his political and economic advantage further set the stage for other producers to clarly 
see the power that they possessed.  By negotiating collectively and threatening to impose 
an embargo if their terms were not met, the producers were able to become a force to be 
reckoned with in both the political and economic arenas due to the West’s overriding fear 









The threat of oil being used as a weapon was all the more real because the 
Western governments, especially the United States, had become dependent on cheap, 
abundant oil for their continued economic growth.  The postwar period in the United 
States produced extensive economic and industrial growth, fueled by the lack of 
industrial competition in war-ravaged Europe and an enlarged domestic industrial 
capacity that had been used in war production.  There were unprecedented levels of 
construction and expansion as business ventures and infrastructure expanded.  All of the 
new industrial and commercial demands required massive amounts of energy to maintain, 
something that the United States had easy access to.  The two main sources of this cheap 
electric energy were coal and oil and the demands for both of these resources, especially 
oil, were incredible.  By 1955, the United States was consuming 37 percent of the world’s 
energy production, and 58.4 percent of its petroleum production.2  Despite the large 
quantities, industries were able to keep their production costs low in large part because of 
the very low cost of oil.  In 1955, for example, the value of primary energy materials 
consumed in the U.S. constituted only about 3 percent of the total value of goods and 
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services.  These low energy costs also allowed for lowered costs of production and 
transportation.3 
 Cheap oil, and therefore cheap energy, not only lowered the cost of production 
but also made industries more efficient.  The low costs of energy allowed for more 
investment in capital, which in turn made labor more efficient.  This propelled enormous 
growth in the U.S. economy.4  The sheer size of the economic growth in the United States 
after World War II was staggering, with the Gross National Product (GNP) expanding 
from $1.511 trillion in 1946 to $4.161 trillion by 1973.5 
 While it is impossible to quantify the exact role cheap oil and energy played in the 
economic boom, there is strong empirical evidence showing that higher energy prices had 
a substantial negative effect on the economy.  During the postwar period and through 
1973, there were eight periods of recession in the United States.  All but one of these 
recessions was preceded by an increase in the price of oil.  These price increases tended 
to be followed by reductions in real GNP growth that would not have been anticipated on 
the basis of previous behavior of other factors like output, prices, or money supply.  This 
significant correlation between oil price increases and real output cannot be explain d as 
a mere coincidence.  Conversely, there is strong evidence that the timing, magitude, and 
duration of at least some of the recessions prior to 1973 would have been different had 
the oil price increase or accompanying energy shortages not occurred.6  
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 Middle Eastern countries knew how much the industrialized countries, especially 
the United States, relied on their oil.  They also knew that they could cause economic 
calamity if the oil spigots were suddenly turned off.  Their oil could be used as a political, 
economic, and military weapon if they chose to cut back production or place a complete 
embargo on whatever nations they chose.  The oil reserves that other countries so 
desperately needed could be utilized to accomplish whatever objective they desir d, and 
as Western dependency on oil rose, so did the Arabs power.  
Despite the growing dependence on imported oil, the U.S. did not have a cohesive 
energy plan to deal with an energy crisis.  The idea of an energy plan, an organized 
strategy for the allocation, distribution and consumption of energy seemed to be of littl
importance to the United States government.  In the years immediately following World 
War II, there seemed to be little need to prepare for a potential cutoff of energy resources.  
The major oil companies controlled the oil supply in the Middle East, which, coupled 
with the United States’ global military protection and sizable market power, should have 
assured the inward flow of natural resources at low prices.  The United States, ther fore, 
lacked compelling reasons to formulate an energy policy and one was not created, a move 
that would leave them vulnerable and unprepared for an energy crisis.7  
Only A Commodity 
 
 From the proliferation of the usage of oil until the 1973 embargo, the United 
States government viewed oil as simply a commodity, subject to market forces and 
fluctuating in price as well as in supply and demand levels.  The government believed 
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that there would always be access to oil, even during turmoil in the Middle East, because 
producing nations would always want to sell it to the West.   
 Because of this belief, the U.S. government paid little attention as dependence on 
foreign oil reached new heights during the 1960s.  Despite the demand, prices remained 
low and supply remained adequate.  Even with the emergence of OPEC and with member 
nations exerting more control over their oil production, the United States believed that 
producers were always forced to sell their commodities at market determined prices, and 
as the largest consumer of oil, the United States believed it could heavily influence the 
price.  Since the oil supply was basically secure because the oil producers were beholden 
to the U.S. for fair compensation, little attempt was made to conserve use or search for 
more reserves domestically.  Some oil companies did frame the 1956 Suez Canal closure 
as a crisis of national security in regard to the oil supply in their push for import quotas, 
later passed by Congress, which spurred more investment and exploration in domestic 
reserves.  However, this push was more to raise the domestic price of oil in a quest for 
greater profits by the oil companies than a genuine plea to protect the oil flow.  The 
importance of oil and its supply was still far from the U.S. government’s mind.8 
The low priority put on energy management and policy by the U.S. government is 
best illustrated by the confusion over who had authority in energy matters.  A survey of 
federal energy organization in the early 1970s showed that the responsibilities for 
decision making for federal programs directly related to energy were spread over eight 
departments.  In addition, numerous offices, independent agencies, and commissions 
                                                




based in the executive branch had limited authority.9  As energy, and oil in particular, 
became a more pressing issue during the 1970s more attention was given to organization 
of decision makers, and authority was streamlined, culminating in the creation of the 
Department of Energy in 1977.  Before the oil embargo of 1973, however, energy policy 
makers were scattered and unorganized; leading to the lack of an adequate and coherent
energy policy when one was desperately needed during the oil crisis. 
Control and Maintain  
 
Whatever policies the U.S. government had toward energy were instituted more 
for general foreign policy purposes than for energy concerns.  In the Middle East, the aim 
of U.S. policy was to protect strategic and economic interests, which centered on oil.  The 
goal, therefore, was to avoid disruptions to the oil flow and allow the oil companies to 
keep the United States stocked with affordable petroleum.  This, however, was not seen 
as a problematic issue.  While it was true that social unrest in the Middle East during the 
1960s shined a brighter spotlight on the region, the government did not believe they were 
directly threatened.  The United States thought they could still greatly influence political, 
social, and economic matters, as the major oil companies had done in the previous 
decades.10 
Since the United States and the oil companies had invested hundreds of billions of 
dollars in the Middle East and depended on the unimpeded flow of oil, they had a 
discernable interest in keeping political and social upheaval to a minimum.  The U.S. was 
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faced with a perpetually difficult situation, however, with the hatred of the Arabs toward 
the Israelis.  The U.S. had to appease both sides, but especially the Arabs, and was forced 
to craft a foreign policy that maintained traditional allies but also kept the oil flow ng.  To 
accomplish this, the U.S. sought to exert its influence in the area politically, supporting 
friendly regimes and working to prevent war or any major shift in the regional balance, 
political or military.11  As an ARAMCO executive later stated, the “basic foreign policy 
of the United States of America in the Middle East has been preservation of stability and 
status quo.”12 
With this maintenance strategy in place, during the 1960s the U.S. government 
viewed radical nationalism, not OPEC, as the main threat to strategic and economic 
interests in the Middle East.  Those who espoused the doctrine of nationalism and pan-
Arabism, especially Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and the Baath party in Iraq, were seen 
as having the ability to disrupt the balance of the U.S. interests in the Middle East and 
therefore had to be countered.  President Kennedy attempted to accomplish this goal by 
forging a personal relationship with Nasser and using a foreign aid program “to persuade 
Nasser to concentrate on making progress at home rather than trouble abroad.”13 
  The economic incentive did not budge Nasser, however, and Kennedy again 
confronted him during the Yemen civil war in 1962, but this time militarily.  The civil 
war had developed into a struggle between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the United States 
tried to pressure Nasser to withdraw his forces from the Arabian Peninsula by sending a 
squadron of U.S. Air Force jets to Saudi Arabia to prevent any incursions into Saudi 
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airspace.  In addition, Kennedy sent more military aid to Saudi Arabia and planned joint 
military maneuvers with its army.  Kennedy had more on his mind than just dissuading 
Nasser, however, as his aim was to prevent the conflict from spilling over in to Saudi 
territory at a time when there was internal dissension with the ruling Saudi family and 
armed forces.  Kennedy hoped to calm the situation and maintain the friendly elements of 
the Saudi government.14  
Kennedy’s attempts to influence Nasser and prevent him from spreading 
nationalism in the Middle East dissolved under the Johnson Administration.  U.S. 
intervention in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and the Congo created hostile 
environments that dissuaded military pressure that may have been applied to Nasser.15  
However, the U.S. government believed that even if Nasser did promote nationalism and 
incite a crisis, the U.S. would be well capable of dealing with it, because they alwa s had 
before.  The overriding principle of U.S. policy in the Middle East was to keep the oil 
flowing and U.S. interests protected, and crisis had been present in one form or another 
since the creation of the Israeli state, but the oil flow had never been seriously threatened.  
Therefore, the government believed that crisis would and could exist with the oil still
flowing out of the region.  This, in addition to the constant fear of provoking the Soviet 
Union, is the main reason why the U.S. did not seek to intervene more often in the area, 
and why the U.S. did not attempt to mediate the Arab-Israeli disputes, because they did 
not want to offend either party.  Israel was a strong ally to the United States and the 
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government wanted them to stay an ally, but the U.S. also did not want to upset the 
Arabs, who might impede the oil business.16 
During the 1960s the Middle East was seen by the United States as a region where 
the status quo must be maintained.  The U.S. chose to tread lightly in the affairs of the 
area, however, so as not to incur the displeasure of any of the parties deemed important to 
the protection of U.S. interests.  While the U.S. occasionally showed its military strength 
in the area, the weapons of choice for influencing the region were primarily economic 
and political, because it was believed that the U.S. could always control vital eventsand 
policymakers.  This had been the case with Mossadeq’s nationalization in 1951 and the 
Suez Crisis in 1956 when crises were averted by U.S. intervention and pressure, and 
because of this belief, the need for an energy policy to deal with emergencies was not 
seen.  
Nixon’s First Years in Office 
 
The view that the oil supply and the Middle East were not substantial problems 
was still present when Richard Nixon ascended to the presidency in 1969.  At the time he 
came into office, the world economy treated cheap oil as standard and excess production 
as the main economic problem.  At approximately two dollars a barrel in 1969, the U.S. 
government was chiefly concerned with satisfying all of the oil-producing countries that 
competed with each other for U.S. favor and access to American markets.  These 
countries offered generous foreign policy benefits in exchange for the right to sell their 
oil.  The Shah of Iran, the staunchest U.S. ally in the Middle East, frequently lobbied for 
more U.S. oil sales.  In 1969 he offered to help the U.S. create an emergency oil stockpile 
by filling salt domes with barrels of oil in the United States.  He hoped this would protect 
                                                




the U.S. oil supply in case of a war, and proposed selling one million of barrels of oil a 
day to the United States for a ten year period, at a bargain price of one dollar a barrel.17  
However, the U.S. rejected this offer because the extra business with Iran would lessen 
purchases from other friendly Arab states, namely Saudi Arabia.  Also, the U.S. 
government was not in the business of buying oil for anything other than military 
purposes, and the majority of that need was supplied by Saudi Arabia.  Finally, there was 
fear that the excess sales would lower the price of oil, an outcome that seemed at the time 
to be worse to U.S. interests than high oil prices.18 
At the end of the 1960s the United States only imported 20 percent of its oil, and 
new discoveries on Alaska’s North Slope led Americans to believe that there were large 
untapped domestic reserves.  The Texas Railroad Commission, the enforcement agency 
of U.S. government oil policy, specified that domestic production of oil be well below 
capacity in order to maintain a domestic price of $3.30 a barrel, more than a dollar ab ve 
the world rate, to encourage domestic exploration and drilling.  The concern that 
prevailed in the Railroad Commission’s mind was one of excess supply and keeping th  
domestic price of oil at a level that would allow for domestic production.19   
The United States was able to greatly influence the price of oil in the late 1960s, 
leading to the belief that OPEC’s power could be checked.  By maintaining a steady
supply of domestic oil and the threat of expanded drilling, the U.S. believed that OPEC 
nations would be dissuaded from raising prices.  If the price of oil was raised beyond a 
level tolerated by the U.S. then domestic production would increase and imports 
restricted, forcing the oil producers to attempt to sell on the world markets.  If the U.S. 
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wanted to make a stronger point, it could sell U.S. oil on those same world markets, 
lowering prices and cutting revenues to OPEC nations.  The oil imports to the United 
States were also strictly regulated through a system that had been established y 
President Eisenhower in 1959.20  Import controls would normally be believed to hurt 
exporting nations, but in the case of OPEC nations, ending the controls would actually 
force them to lower their oil prices.21  The producers, in the eyes of the U.S. government, 
had the incentive to keep prices low and to not anger their biggest customer who had the 
ability to hurt them financially. 
Thus, during the first years of the Nixon Administration energy was considered a 
domestic, not a foreign, issue.  The main focus was on keeping domestic production low 
enough to ensure a decent price for domestic producers, but still extracting enough oil to 
keep OPEC at bay and in the weak negotiating position that they had always been in.  Oil 
producers seemed to be the supplicants, as OPEC countries jockeyed for position in U.S. 
markets.  Because of this, OPEC was not taken seriously, or viewed as a formidable 
threat to U.S. interests.  It was believed by U.S. officials that producers could not cut 
their production enough to drive up prices because the cutback would have to be so steep 
that it would lead them to bankruptcy before they could inflict significant damage to th ir 
industrialized customers.22   
This belief that OPEC could be checked faded as U.S. consumption rose and the 
U.S. began losing their surplus production capacity.  This trend of increasing oil needs, 
which began in 1970, forced domestic oil installations to reach their maximum 
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production levels by the early 1970s.  Still, consumption required more oil than the U.S. 
could produce, forcing the nation to begin importing greater amounts of OPEC oil.  The 
United States had been importing only 20 percent of its oil in the late 1960s, but by 1973 
they were importing 36.1 percent.  Imported oil became a necessity for American life, 
and without the threat of increased domestic production, the U.S. lost its ability to 
hamper world price increases or protect itself from an oil shutoff.  U.S. leverage had been 
lost, giving power to OPEC nations, as the U.S. now became the supplicants.23 
Up through the beginning of the Nixon Administration the U.S. government 
placed little concern or emphasis on energy management or energy policy.  Oil was
treated as only a commodity; a commodity that the United States believed it could 
effectively set the price for.  This was true, as long as the United States retained the 
ability to produce more oil domestically as a method of checking the price and supply-
setting powers of OPEC.  In addition, the U.S. arrogantly believed that it could always 
influence Middle Eastern politics, and assert its will using political and economic aid, as 
well as the threat of military intervention.  With this mindset in place, the U.S. 
government did not prepare for a time when the supply of imported oil would decrease, 
and never enacted an energy policy to deal with the issues an oil shutoff might bring.  
The U.S. believed that Middle Eastern affairs and the world oil business were static.  This 
lack of foresight during the 1960s would cost the United States dearly when the U.S. lost 
the ability to produce enough oil to satisfy its needs in the early 1970s.  Nixon later 
wrote, “This was not something that had happened overnight.  The predicament of the 
1970s was the result of shortsighted government policies compounded by decades of 
                                                




wasteful habits.”24  The lack of attention to oil and energy needs would force the United 
States to come face to face with the issues when the OPEC nations decided to flex their 
muscles in 1973.
                                                





Chapter 4: “General atmosphere was attentiveness and 
acknowledgment…but a large degree of disbelief that any 
drastic action was imminent.”1 
 
Sadat’s Grand Plans 
 
The march toward the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the accompanying oil embargo 
was hastened, not by disputes in the oil industry, but by a transition of power in Egypt.  
In 1970, Gamal Nasser died while still president of Egypt, leaving his vice-president, 
Anwar Sadat, as his successor.  Sadat picked up Nasser’s rhetoric of Arab unity and 
dignity, proclaiming that 1971 would be a “Year of Decision” that the world would be 
forced to respond to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinians as well as promising 
“total confrontation” with Israel.  Such grand pronouncements were typical of Sdat, and 
many of his political opponents and foreign leaders looked on him with contempt.  Many 
labeled him as a half-wit, but Sadat proved to be much more cunning.2  
Although there was little in Sadat’s background to have prepared him for the 
presidency, he did carry with him Nasser’s ideals and a distinct memory of his humble 
background.  He had been grateful to the Soviet Union when they rushed to Egypt’s aid 
after the disastrous 1967 war, but he steadfastly refused to further disgrace his country by 
totally submitting to the will of the Soviet Union.  He felt that Egypt’s “face” had been 
“blackened” by their defeat, and only an “honourable” fight might “whiten” it again.  In 
addition, he spoke publicly about regaining the land lost in the war to Israel and removing 
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the shame on Egypt by, as he said, “putting an end to Israel’s arrogant boasting of the 
past twenty-three years.”3  
Sadat knew that the two main pillars of Nasserist policy, Arab socialism and 
dependence on the Soviet Union, were failing fast.  As he searched for alternatives i the 
summer of 1972, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers suggested to Sadat during a 
diplomatic meeting that President Nixon might be willing to help Egypt with aid and in 
their dealings with Israel if Sadat would lessen the large number of Soviet exper s and 
technicians stationed in Egypt.4  American assistance, however, was contingent upon the 
U.S. filling the influence void vacated by the Russians once Sadat expelled them.5 This 
dangled carrot, coupled with Soviet insistence on seeking peaceful negotiations wih 
Israel and their hesitation to supply Egypt with arms to wage a war, pushed Sadat in July 
1972 to expel the Soviets, effective immediately.  This seeming coup for the U.S., 
though, was Sadat’s masquerade.  He used the expulsion to keep the United States 
interested in mediating Middle Eastern affairs.  Sadat had already decide to go to war 
with Israel, and he feared that if he had non-Arab partners the credit for hispotential 
victory would go to them, and he was unwilling to share the glory.  The only way he 
knew to restore Egypt’s “face” was for Arab countries to conquer Israel and restore Arab 
dignity.6  The United States failed to look below the surface of Sadat’s actions, the 
beginning of a pattern that would persist in their dealings with him until he surprised 
them with his true intentions in 1973.   
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From that point forward, Sadat undertook a successful plan of distracting the 
United States with friendship overtures while preparing his military for aull-scale war 
with Israel.  Egypt and the United States attempted to set up a preliminary meeting 
between Henry Kissinger and Sadat’s national security advisor, Hafiz Ismail, in the fall 
of 1972, but the United States postponed the meeting due to its preoccupation with the 
Vietnam peace talks.7  Vietnam was front and center in the minds of policymakers, the 
Middle East was relegated to the background.  While waiting for the United States, S dat 
fired his veteran War Minister and replaced him with an ally who was given the task of 
readying the military, as well as a much larger budget.  Sadat then publicly announced 
that he was opening enrollment into Egypt’s commando units and declared that all 
volunteers would undergo arduous training and would then be sent to the front lines of 
Sinai, in just six months.8 
The United States, however, did not take Sadat’s threats seriously.  Anti-Israeli 
bluster was common among Arab leaders, as it was often used to show support for 
radicals who clamored for war with Israel and as a unifying cry for Arabs throughout the 
Middle East.  By repeatedly and loudly proclaiming his true intentions the outside world 
stopped believing Sadat was seriously preparing for war.  In 1971, his “Year of 
Decision,” he had done nothing while the world expected that he would.  The United 
States had been fooled by Sadat before and Kissinger summed up Sadat’s latest war talk,
“In the light of previous Egyptian threats that had not been carried out, we did not take 
this too seriously, especially as our intelligence estimates agreed in bing unable to define 
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a realistic Egyptian military option.”9  U.S. policymakers commonly believed that Sadat 
had few military options and that Israel’s military superiority was so unquestionable that 
any attack by Sadat would inevitably lead to a quick Israeli victory or, at wors, a brief 
skirmish followed by diplomatic negotiating.  According to Kissinger, “[An attack’s] sole 
function would be to heat up international concern and pressure for negotiation.  Its 
failure would only deepen the diplomatic stalemate.”10 
The dismissive attitude of the U.S. government toward Sadat was intensified due 
to other, seemingly more important, issues occurring at the same time.  The Watergate 
scandal came into the nation’s conscience in the summer of 1972 and as the story gained 
momentum, it forced the Nixon administration to spend ever-increasing amounts of time
dealing with it.  Nixon, whose greatest successes as president had come in the foreign 
policy arena, now was forced to turn his full attention to handling domestic turmoil.  As 
Kissinger later wrote, “I found it difficult to get Nixon to focus on foreign policy…In the 
past, even in calm periods, he had immersed himself in foreign policy to enliven the job 
of managing the government, which ultimately bored him.  Now it was difficult to get 
him to address memoranda.”11  
Kissinger, the man who Nixon was effectively relying on to address foreign 
policy concerns, also had his attention diverted from Sadat and the Middle East.  
Kissinger was working on negotiating the peace settlement in Vietnam, which culminated 
with the Paris Peace Accords, signed in January 1973.  However, there were 
complications with several key issues that persisted into the summer.  While Kiss nger 
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did meet with Arab officials during the first half of 1973, Middle East peace was only 
one of the foreign policy fronts he was attempting to juggle simultaneously.12  
Watergate also served to weaken the Nixon administration’s ability to make 
credible commitments and statements about foreign affairs.  With the withering pol tical 
assaults in the U.S. from Democrats and calls for new investigations into the mater, the 
Administration had to tread lightly because of the underlying belief of the public and 
opposing political officials who accused Nixon and Kissinger of creating crises to divert 
attention away from the problems surrounding Watergate.  Kissinger later ecalled this 
burden on the presidency and foreign policy of the United States stating, “With every 
passing day Watergate was circumscribing our freedom of action.  We were losing the 
ability to make credible commitments, for we could no longer guarantee Congressional 
approval.”13  That belief stretched to foreign leaders as well, who constantly questioned 
whether Nixon could back his promises in light of the perceived erosion of his authority.  
Kissinger was forced to “avoid confrontations for fear of being unable to sustain them in 
the miasma of domestic suspicion.”14  When the October War began, Kissinger 
immediately recognized that troubles in the United States had helped stoke Sadat’s
willingness to launch an offensive.  As he said in a conversation with White House Chief 
of Staff Alexander Haig, “I think our domestic situation has invited this.”15 
As 1973 arrived and the primary attention of the United States was fixated 
elsewhere, Sadat sent his security advisor Hafiz Ismail to meet with Kissinger in 
                                                
12 William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1998), 433. 
13 Kissinger, Years, 124. 
14 Ibid., 124. 
15 Henry Kissinger, Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises (New York: Simon & 




Washington in late February.  Just prior to this, Sadat had received several secret 
messages from Nixon, drafted by Kissinger, pledging that the administration would focus 
on the Middle East as soon as the Vietnam negotiations were concluded.16  With this 
assurance, Ismail laid down the demands that Israel was to return to its pre-1967 War 
borders and withdraw from occupied territories.  Kissinger, still under the assumption 
that this was just continuing bravado, agreed to discuss the subject at a later date.  As he 
put it, the deal offered by Sadat “was so heavily qualified with unacceptable conditions 
that it was more compatible with a come-on to get us involved than with a serious effort 
to negotiate.  We needed more time to determine what Sadat had in mind.”17   
Kissinger came away from the meeting with little optimism.  He felt that the 
Egyptians were unwilling to negotiate a settlement that could be agreed upon by the 
Israelis.18  Ismail, however, seems to have taken a different view of the meeting and 
believed that the U.S. was ready to help mediate the conflict, news he passed to Sadat.  
However, as he was traveling back to Egypt, Ismail’s enthusiasm was somewhat 
diminished by a New York Times report that Nixon had decided to furnish Israel with 84 
new attack aircraft.19   Because of the conflicting signals, Sadat also felt that tangible 
results were lacking, but he believed that Kissinger had tacitly encouraged a military 
confrontation with Israel.  Sadat summed up this feeling in his memoirs.  “It was 
impossible…for the United States…to make a move if we ourselves didn’t take military 
action to break the deadlock.  The drift of what Kissinger said to Ismail was that the 
United States regrettably could do nothing to help so long as we were the defeated party 
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and Israel maintained her superiority.”20  Kissinger records nothing of this nature in his 
memoirs.  While this statement may be nothing more that Sadat spreading blame, it is 
clear that Sadat was in no way discouraged from his war plan by Ismail’s meeting with 
Kissinger. 
Unbeknownst to the Americans, Sadat was engaging in his plan that would allow 
him to solicit U.S. mediation and aid once his military plans were accomplished.  To 
evoke such a response from the United States, Sadat reckoned that he needed to first 
prove that Israel was not invincible and that the Egyptian Army was a formidable force.  
He also believed he had to gain approval for his military plans by garnering the united 
support of the Arab world, including promises from Arab leaders for an oil embargo to 
help pressure Israel’s allies.21  While Kissinger and the government stalled under the 
belief that Middle Eastern problems could be controlled and postponed, Sadat set off 
around the region to gather support from his fellow Arab leaders. 
Arab Unity  
 
After securing an alliance and coordinating attack plans with Syria, Sadat went to 
the other Arab nations requesting their assistance and cooperation for his upcoming war.  
After receiving assurances of support from the major Arab nations, including the 
traditional ally of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Sadat credited his succes  on divine 
intervention.  “Thus it was God’s will that I should have close personal relationships with 
the leaders of the Arab world.  They all welcomed me as President and showed that they 
were willing to help.”22  In every stop on his tour, Sadat preached Arab unity.  “My clear 
and declared policy was that Egypt could not distinguish one Arab country from another 
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on the basis of so-called progressive and reactionary or republican and monarchial 
systems.  We should be committed to one thing only- our Arab character, pure and 
simple.”23  With this in mind, Sadat reached out to all Arab nations, even those with 
whom he had ideological or political differences, and he found common ground with 
other nations by blaming Israel for Arab problems.  As Sadat saw it, Israel was 
capitalizing on Arab disunity, and the only way to break the “all-pervading world Zionist 
movement” was to unify and create a situation where Arab nations came to the help of 
any other Arab nation targeted by Israel.24 
Along with gathering ideological support, Sadat looked to secure economic 
backing from the other Arab countries in the form of an oil embargo to press the West 
into mediating the conflict with Israel.  To coincide with his military attack, Sadat wanted 
the assistance of an embargo to give his campaign a two-pronged front, both military and 
economic.  An embargo had the ability to reach further and inflict more hardship than any 
action the Egyptians and Syrians could accomplish.  Sadat realized that oil could 
potentially play a huge role in forcing the West into action, and the oil-producers knew 
that such an event, if well coordinated, could raise prices and give them greater leverage 
in the industry.25  The OAPEC nations were becoming dissatisfied with the current 
pricing agreement, and sought to strengthen their position.26  The desires and goals of 
both Sadat and OAPEC thus fit together perfectly. 
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The Tehran pricing agreement, just two years into its five-year run, had become 
obsolete in the minds of OAPEC nations.  Since the per-barrel price was fixed in U.S. 
dollars, OAPEC nations received a uniform price for their oil.  However, in 1971 the 
United States took its currency off of the gold standard and allowed the market to set i s 
value, which resulted in a devalued dollar.  The OAPEC nations were now receiving a 
lesser amount than before for their oil, and attempted to reopen negotiations with the oil 
companies to fix this “loophole.”27  When the oil companies dragged their feet with 
further price negotiations in the spring of 1973, OAPEC nations saw Sadat and his 
military plans as their way to force the issue on oil companies.28  By allying with him and 
his cause, OAPEC nations could pressure the oil companies into a new and more 
profitable pricing agreement.  Up until this time, the Arabs had usually attempted to keep 
politics and economics apart as much as possible, for fear of the economic loss that might 
come from retaliation by world powers.29  From this point on, however, politics and 
economics would be linked, causing problems for the United States and the West. 
Faisal’s Plight 
 
While the Arab nations responded positively to Sadat’s plan for a military assault 
on Israel and the threatening of an oil embargo, it put the more conservative Arab 
governments into a difficult situation.  Traditional U.S. allies, such as Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan, were continually attempting to appease their more radical citizens and brethren 
while still maintaining good relations with the West, their financial lifeline.  Often the 
radical elements would attempt to pressure conservative governments into taking harsher 
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stances against the West in order to hurt Israel.  When these demands were not met, 
sabotage often resulted.  Such was the case in 1973 when radical Arabs sabotaged two oil 
pipelines in Saudi Arabia and threatened more disruption.30   
Sadat correctly recognized that Egypt’s army would be beaten in their fight 
against the Israelis if the U.S. was able to re-supply Israel, and asked that Saudi Arabia 
keep the United States in check by using its oil as a weapon of deterrence.  This put King 
Faisal of Saudi Arabia in a politically untenable position.31  Faisal was used to dealing 
with internal Arab dissent, but his staunch support of the United States caused him to lose 
face with Sadat and the rest of the Arab world when Nixon decided to sell the new 
aircraft to Israel, a direct threat to Sadat’s plans.  With the risk of beingalienated by the 
other Arab leaders, as well as the threat of more disruptions to Saudi Arabia’s one 
profitable resource, Faisal sent his oil minister, Sheikh Yamani, to Washington to appeal 
to the U.S. government.  During meetings with U.S. officials in April 1973, Yamani 
linked oil and politics for the first time.  He told the Americans that it was impossible for 
Saudi Arabia to work against the interests of its Arab brethren.  U.S. officials, however, 
failed to take Yamani seriously, and believed he was speaking for himself and not Faisal. 
To help quell this misgiving, Faisal told ARAMCO’s president that he was “not able to 
stand alone much longer”32 in an Arab world where pressure was building for the use of 
oil as a weapon.33 
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Despite reports that Arab arms were being moved about the Middle East and 
Sadat’s claims that he wanted “total confrontation” and was thinking about “warming up” 
the Sinai peninsula, Kissinger and other U.S. policymakers refused to take him 
seriously.34  In an April 1973 assessment of Sadat, the CIA concluded that although he 
may have begun to take his talk more seriously, he was most likely not yet at th  point of 
decision and that there were no indications of planning for any specific military ope ation 
at a specific time.35  They still clung to the idea that Sadat was bluffing.36 
American policymakers refused to believe that Sadat was serious despite rpeated 
warnings from other sources.  In May 1973 several high-ranking foreign diplomats and 
officials attempted to convey the seriousness of Sadat’s intentions.  Soviet premier 
Leonid Brezhnev and his foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, both of whom were still very 
connected with Sadat, warned Kissinger of the growing danger in the Middle East during 
his trip to Russia and again at a summit with Nixon in June.  However, Kissinger 
dismissed these warnings as “psychological warfare because [American officials] did not 
see any rational military option that would not worsen the Soviet and Arab position.”37  
King Hussein of Jordan also sent warning to the United States in May, stating that Syrian 
and Egyptian military preparations were too realistic to be considered maneuvers.  Again, 
Kissinger ignored the threat, telling Hussein dismissively that the United States was 
“watching the situation very carefully.”38  At nearly the same time, Newsweek’s senior 
diplomatic correspondent, Arnaud de Borchgrave, told Kissinger over lunch that the fever 
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for war was growing all over the Middle East, especially in Egypt.  Israel, in contrast, 
took the threats very seriously.  In May, they ordered a partial mobilization of their 
forces.39 
Even with all of these warnings, the United States still did not grasp the gravity of 
the situation.  The failure occurred on several levels of the government.  Kissinger and 
his advisory group, the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), stuck to the 
assumption that Sadat would not want to go to war because he was aware of the potential 
severe consequences.40  James Schlesinger, then director of the CIA, weighed in with his 
department’s report stating that Egypt lacked the military capabilities to fight Israel, as 
well as believing that if an attack would occur, it would come after more diplomatic 
attempts were made.41 
One of the major components that U.S. policymakers missed was of the role of 
the oil in the Arab plans.  While Sadat was gathering the support of the major oil 
producers for a possible embargo to further his military options, OAPEC was seeking to 
seize greater dominance in the oil business, and both parties recognized the potential 
opportunities that the other could provide.  King Faisal, who recognized the severity of 
the situation, used a meeting with ARAMCO officials on May 3 to convey the gravity of 
the predicament.  Faisal told the oil company representatives that it was mandatory th t 
the United States government do something to change the direction of events in the 
Middle East, and that while he realized the situation in the United States, he could not 
stand the pressure from the radicals or other Arab leaders much longer.  He told the 
representatives that it was up to those Americans and American enterprises that were 
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friends of the Arabs and had interests in the region to change the posture of the U.S. 
government.  Faisal claimed “a simple government disavowal of Israeli policies and 
actions” would “go a long way toward overcoming the current anti-American feeli g.”42  
He went on to comment that he was amazed at the failure of the U.S. government to 
recognize where its true interests were.  Repeatedly, Faisal emphasized to the oilmen that 
it was up to U.S. businesses to make the government act quickly.  Although the king 
never brought up the specific subject of oil and energy, the oil representatives bel eved 
that Faisal intended to impress the seriousness of the situation on them, so that 
ARAMCO and the oil industry could pressure the U.S. government to act.43 
When U.S. policy remained unchanged, Faisal desperately tried once again three 
weeks later to warn the United States of the impending disaster, using the oilmen as 
intermediaries.  Faisal, who had just returned from a diplomatic trip to Cairo where Sadat 
had pushed for more political support, repeatedly said that he felt a need for increasing 
friendship with the United States and that time was running out as to U.S. interests in the 
Middle East.  Saudi Arabia, according to Faisal, was in danger of being isolated in the 
Arab world for its continuing support of the United States and he would not allow that to 
happen.  Faisal told the representatives very clearly, “You will lose everything” and that 
they needed to pass this message on to the U.S. government.44   
The oil representatives did not mistake the underlying theme of Faisal’s warning.  
“Concession is clearly at risk,” one of the oil executives said later of Faisal’s meaning.45  
These men recognized that Faisal was threatening them with the loss of theirability to 
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receive oil, not just from Saudi Arabia but from the whole region.  The process in which 
control of oil extrapolation gradually shifted to the oil producers would be complete if the 
individual countries took control, seizing the oil companies’ investments and potentially 
shutting them out of any future ability to have access to the oil reserves.  This was the 
worst-case scenario for the oil companies; to lose all of their investments and bet the 
complete mercy of the oil producers.46   
Determined not to allow this to happen, the ARAMCO executives met with key 
U.S. officials, including White House advisor Brent Scowcroft, acting Secretary of 
Defense Bill Clements, and State Department officials.  Their purpose was to convey to 
the government the stakes at risk, and to convince them of the severity of the situation.  
The oil executives passed along Faisal’s points, stressing that if policies f the United 
States remain unchanged, then the traditional friendship toward American businesse  in 
Saudi Arabia would not be preserved.  Also, it was not only in the United States or Saudi 
Arabia’s interest that friendly relations be preserved, but also to stem the tide of isolation 
that Saudi Arabia might face from the Arab world, further hurting U.S. interests.  The 
unequivocal support of the United States toward Israel was causing Arabs to be swayed
by Communist and radical elements, causing ordinary Arabs to become anti-American.  
The oil executives summed up Faisal’s argument; if the present circumstances remain 
unchanged then all American interests will suffer, as Saudi Arabia will remove U.S. 
interests if it becomes isolated due to the United States’ unwavering support for Is ael.  
The executives told the government officials plainly that, “Action must come urgently or 
everything will be lost.”47   
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In what turned out to be a colossal failure of foresight, the government officials 
once again brushed off the warning.  After relaying Faisal’s points and the gravity of the 
predicament, the oilmen noted the reaction of the officials.  The “general atmosphere was 
attentiveness and acknowledgment that a problem existed but a large degree of disb lief 
that any drastic action was imminent or that any action other than those already underway 
should happen.”48  The government officials believed that the pressure placed upon Saudi 
Arabia and Faisal to enter into a joint action against Israel and the West, both militarily 
and with an oil embargo, was inflated.  They pointed out that Saudi Arabia had resisted 
what they considered to be greater pressure from Nasser, and Saudi Arabia would resist 
again, because of its reliance on the West for income.  The officials believed that Faisal 
was “calling wolf” when the situation was in his head, and that the region was still under 
control.49 
Part of the blame for the officials’ dismissal of the warnings laid with the U.S. 
intelligence agencies.  Intelligence reports concerning the Middle East relied 
overwhelmingly on Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, reports.  Evaluations of the 
Middle East that were not supported by Mossad intelligence received little attention, and 
Israel did not believe that war was imminent.  Israel’s assessment of the situation agreed 
with American intelligence that stated an Egyptian attack would be disastrous, and since 
the preeminent source of reliable information on the Middle East matched up with the 
accepted view on Sadat and the likelihood of war, the United States dismissed Faisal’s
warnings.50  
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These officials, and the majority of policymakers in the U.S. government, did not 
recognize the power that Arab countries could wield if they flexed their economic 
muscles for political purposes.  They did not foresee any situations where the Arabs 
could unite their military and economic abilities to effectively hurt the United States.  
However, with OAPEC striving to gain more power of oil pricing, Sadat rallying support 
across the Middle East for his campaign against Israel, Watergate and other poli ical 
scandals erupting in the United States, the United States’ unwillingness to attempt to 
defuse the situation between the Arabs and Israel, and its growing reliance on the region 
to meet its energy needs, the perfect storm was created.   
When these forces came together in the October War and oil embargo later in 
1973, U.S. officials were surprised and unprepared, although they should not have been.  
This storm had actually been predicted and espoused a month before Faisal’s meeting 
with the ARAMCO executives by a high-ranking U.S. official.  James Akins, the Stat
Department’s senior oil analyst, published a piece in Foreign Affairs magazine calling 
attention to this exact occurrence.  Entitled “The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here” 
Akins argued that Arab threats of oil supply reductions and embargoes were shifting from 
being economically based to politically based, and that the threats were increasi g in 
number and regularity.  If the Arabs exerted enough power of the oil business, as was 
quickly becoming the case, the Arabs would be in a position to make political demands 
upon the West using their oil as a weapon.  While embargoes had failed in the past, the 
lack of Arab unity and the availability of spare oil production capacity in the United 
States were their undoing, but if those counter-measures were absent, an embargo would 




use oil as a political weapon must be taken seriously.  The vulnerability of the advance  
countries is too great and too plainly evident- and is about to extend to the United 
States.”51  Akins further suggested that action be taken immediately to correct the 
problem, adding, “it is abundantly clear that we must move on a variety of fronts if we 
are to avoid a situation which could lead to or even force us into highly dangerous 
action.”52 
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Chapter 5: “To seek a direct confrontation with OPEC may have a 
damaging effect upon the world economy.”1 
 
Subtle Warning 
In June 1973 Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev came to America for a summit 
with Nixon in which an explicit warning about Sadat was passed between the leaders.  
The majority of topics discussed during the week involved agreements that exemplified 
the new “détente”, or peace between the two nations.  However, meetings between 
Kissinger, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and Soviet ambassador Anatoly 
Dobrynin, failed to produce an agreement on what to do about the situation in the Middle 
East.  On the last evening of the conference after President Nixon had retired, Kissinger 
received an urgent phone call asking him to wake Nixon for an unscheduled meeting with 
Brezhnev.  For the next three hours, Brezhnev attempted to push Nixon into an agreement 
on the Middle East, stating that he feared Sadat would go to war without a serious 
indication that negotiations were a real possibility.2  Brezhnev hoped to avoid war in the 
Middle East because it held the possibility of dragging the Soviet Union and U.S. into 
conflict with each other through support for their respective allies, something the United 
States wished to avoid as well.  The only way to avoid war, according to Brezhnev, was 
to launch a new diplomatic initiative.  In a subtle way, Brezhnev was communicating to 
Nixon that he knew Sadat’s proclamation were more than just idle talk, as the Soviet 
Union was still quietly supplying the weapons for Egypt’s military buildup.   
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Although he offered no specifics, Brezhnev was implying that coming events 
might threaten the new détente.  However, Nixon refused to be bullied into signing off on 
a new initiative without first consulting Kissinger or the Israeli governme t.  Brezhnev 
departed the next day without an agreement in place.  Kissinger later wrote “we 
dismissed this as psychological warfare.”3  Both Nixon and Kissinger passed off 
Brezhnev’s warnings as a heavy-handed ploy to force a Mideast settlement on t rms 
favorable to the Soviets, which they partly were, but they were also a direct warning 
about what Sadat had in store.4 
Sadat’s Final Push 
 
With his armed forces quietly preparing for war, Sadat set out in August to meet 
with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Qatar.5  The trip was his attempt to unify the 
factions in the Arab world, namely those on the “Right and Left” and the “Progressives 
and Reactionaries.”6  Sadat began his tour in Saudi Arabia, where, on August 23, he 
explicitly told King Faisal that he was going to war soon.  While the “D-Day” was
already scheduled, Sadat stopped short of telling Faisal the exact date.  Faisal, in Sadat’s 
view, supported the idea, and asked what assistance Saudi Arabia could provide.  Sadat 
replied, “Nothing in particular, just take note that I am about to start a war.  You will 
make your decisions in due course, for each of us knows his own domestic affairs best.”7  
Faisal had one request, “I would ask only one thing of you: if you start a war, do not stop 
it after an hour or a day.  Go on, so that we can take a united Arab position at your side.”8  
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Sadat knew he would need the financial assistance of his Arab neighbors, 
particularly that of Saudi Arabia.  However, his pride prevented him from being upfront 
about his needs with the Arab leaders, choosing rather to say simply, “Just fulfill yo r 
duty as you see fit.”9  The Arab leaders knew what Sadat wanted; the use of Arab oil and 
financial power as a weapon in his war.  While some of the Arab countries, particularly 
Syria and Libya, enthusiastically supported the idea of an embargo, others such aSaudi 
Arabia and most of the other oil-producers rejected it.  Sadat still felt confident though, 
because he believed that even without an embargo, a sophisticated use of Arab monetary 
reserves and economic pressure, if well coordinated, could accomplish the same goal of 
pushing the West to intervene against Israel.10 
To his surprise the meeting with King Faisal produced a pledge beyond Sadat’s 
wildest dreams.  Fed up by increasing pressure and isolation in the Arab world and the 
lack of movement by the U.S. government to help him, the King promised half a billion 
dollars to the war effort, but more importantly, to use his oil as a weapon.  As recently as 
a few months prior, Faisal has adamantly opposed the idea, telling American television 
viewers during an interview with Alfred DeCrane Jr., the chairman of Texaco, that “We 
have no wish to restrict our oil exports to the United States in any way,” but “America’s 
complete support for Zionism and against the Arabs makes it extremely difficult for s to 
continue to supply the United States with oil, or even to remain friends with the United 
States.”11  However, things had changed dramatically for the King.  He was angry that the 
U.S. government had ignored most of his warnings and pleas as to the severity of the 
situation, and decided it was time to act, using his oil if necessary.   
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The Last Missed Warnings 
 
Faisal’s promise to Sadat quickly proved to be more than empty words.  Less than 
a week later on August 27, Faisal’s oil minister Yamani told an ARAMCO executiv  that 
Faisal had suddenly begun requesting detailed reports on ARAMCO’s production, its 
plans for expansion, and for the consequences of curtailment in its production on 
consuming countries, particularly the United States.  Yamani told the executive, “This is 
a completely new phenomenon.  The King never bothered with such details.”12  However, 
Yamani went further with his warnings.  He said that there were elements in the U.S. 
government, led by Kissinger, that “are misleading Nixon as to the seriousness” of the 
King’s intention.13  Because of this dismissive attitude, “the King has been giving 
interviews and making public statements designed to eliminate any doubt that mig t 
exist.”14  The decision to limit oil production in Saudi Arabia rested with one man, Faisal, 
who could act as sole authority if he chooses.  With that authority, continued Yamani, the 
King is “one hundred percent determined to effect a change in U.S. policy and to use oil 
for that purpose.  The King feels a personal obligation to do something and knows that oil 
is now an effective weapon.  He is additionally under constant pressure from Arab public 
opinion and Arab leaders, particularly Sadat.  He is losing patience.”15 
The Nixon Administration again failed, or at least refused to believe, that the 
situation facing the United States was dire.  In the year leading up to October 1973, and 
especially in the last few months, there were a large number of visits by Yamani nd 
other high-ranking Saudi officials, as well as ARAMCO executives, to Washington to 
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discuss what was going on in the Middle East.  While this should have suggested that 
there was truth behind what the Saudis were telling the U.S. officials, they seemed to pass 
off the warnings without recognizing that something monumental was occurring.  This 
mindset was also present in the press, where one writer characterized the frequent visits 
as “an elaborate cosmetic operation on the part of Faisal and the oil companies to 
improve their images in the Arab world without having to mount a real pressure 
campaign against Middle East policy.”16 
OPEC’s Opportunity  
 
By September, international concerns with the growing demand and limited 
supply of oil, as well as the security of the oil supply, led nations to grudgingly prepare 
for an energy crisis.  The West German government implemented an energy plan that 
gave some importance to the security of supply.  In Japan, more drastic measures were 
being taken.  With very little domestic supplies, Japan depended entirely on imported oil.  
Their rapid growth had left them vulnerable to shortages, and they saw that the major oil 
companies who managed their supplies were quickly being overshadowed by the 
emerging power of the oil producers.  This led to a change in their foreign policy not see  
since before the Second World War, a shift away from the United States.  Called
“resource diplomacy,” the plan aimed to protect Japan’s oil supplies at all costs, even if it 
meant turning their backs on the U.S.  The main proponent of the plan, Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry Minister Yashiro Nakasone said, “It is inevitable hat 
Japan will competitively follow her own independent direction.  The era of blindly 
following has come to an end.”17  One of the main goals of the new policy was to 
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demonstrate that Japan was “standing on the side of the oil producing countries.”18  
Nakasone hoped that by siding with the oil producers, Japan would be insulated from any 
future supply disruptions.  Japan knew energy problems were looming.  On September 
26, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka said in a television interview, “Regarding the energy 
crisis, an oil crisis ten years from now is clearly seen.”19    
In the United States, some policy makers were beginning to realize the severity of 
the situation.  The Nixon Administration met with the oil majors to discuss the fear that 
Libya would shut out the companies from production, and after the meeting, decided to 
impose mandatory allocations for some oil products that were in a tight supply 
domestically.  In 1971 Nixon had imposed price controls and quotas on oil, in order to 
fight inflation and encourage domestic oil exploration.  His plan backfired however, as 
with an artificially low price people used more oil and without an economic incentive, 
new domestic exploration was abandoned.  Just two years later, the situation in the 
United States had changed dramatically as the problem was not that there was too much 
oil, but that there was not enough.  In April 1973 Nixon made his first Presidential 
address on the energy crisis and abolished the quotas because domestic supply could no 
longer supply the nation’s oil demands.  He also instituted a “voluntary allocation 
system” at that time, an attempt to assure supplies for the independent refiners.20  
However, these measures largely failed, leaving Nixon trying to coerce the mark t once 
again, rather than attempting to work out a long-term strategy. 
With the end of U.S. importation quotas, the U.S. joined the world oil market 
unhindered.  With demand swelling worldwide, companies bought up all they could, 
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fearing a global shortage.  As demand surged the available supply of oil dwindled, 
creating a situation where independents and refiners bought oil from the companies abov  
the price negotiated between the companies and the producers.  OPEC members, and 
specifically OAPEC nations, decided that they wanted more money for their oil, despite 
the fact that the Tehran and Tripoli agreements were still binding.  OPEC resolved t  use 
the world situation to its advantage, declaring after their July 1973 conference,  
noting that under the present and expected conditions of the world energy market, 
Member Countries should not only strive to attain the appropriate value for their 
oil…taking into account that hydrocarbon resources have constituted an essential 
factor in the economic development of industrialized countries and that a regular 
and secure supply…is of paramount importance for the continuity of their 
economic welfare;21  
The same press release closed with a warning against any industrialized n tion that 
sought to interfere with OPEC.   
any concerted action undertaken by industrialized-importing countries aimed at 
undermining OPEC’s legitimate aspirations would only hamper the stable 
relations that have normally existed between these and OPEC Member Countries, 
and that to seek a direct confrontation with OPEC may have a damaging effect 
upon the world economy;22  
 
It did not take long for OAPEC nations to put their words into action in order to 
obtain a greater percentage of the increase in oil prices.  On September 1, Libya 
nationalized 51 percent of the oil operations it had not already taken over.  Although 
Nixon publicly warned the oil producers that Iran had tried similar tactics twenty y ars 
before and failed, his words had little effect.  The global oil situation had changed 
drastically since Dr. Mossadeq pushed Iran toward nationalization, and now Libya had no
problems selling its oil in a world that was thirsty for it.  Iraq, Algeria, and Libya together 
pushed for revisions to the Tehran and Tripoli agreements.  They felt that the oil 
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companies were benefiting too much from the surge in oil prices, and sought to receive a 
larger share of the revenues.  They wanted to scrap the agreements, and begin 
negotiations anew, now that they were increasing in bargaining power.23  The oil 
producers were no longer the supplicants, begging the oil companies for higher prices and 
a greater portion of the profits.  They were rapidly gaining in power, and they knew it 
was time to squeeze the oil companies.  After their meeting in Vienna on September 16, 
OPEC issued a press release clearly laying out its intentions. 
…regarding…the Tehran, Tripoli…Agreements…decided that since the level of 
posted prices and the annual escalations provided for by those Agreements are no 
longer compatible with prevailing market conditions as well as the galloping 
world inflation, to negotiate…with the representatives of oil companies with a 
view to revising the terms of said Agreements.  The member Countries…decided 
to negotiate collectively the revision of the terms of the Tehran Agreement with 
representatives of the oil companies on 8th October 1973, in Vienna.24 
 
 The push for higher prices and the desired renegotiation of the oil agreements left 
the oil companies scrambling to avert a situation where they lost all power and leverag  
in the Middle East.  To give themselves the most power, they asked for, and received, 
exemption from U.S. antitrust laws so they could bargain collectively.  However, the 
government did not take this negotiation as seriously as the companies did, and they did 
not send any diplomats to the meeting.  The oilmen were there alone, and the U.S. chose 
to receive reports from them rather than intervening or observing firsthand.  This was a 
recurring theme and problem for the U.S. government, and the oil companies were free 
once again to deal as they desired in the Middle East, as they had for decades.  The U.S. 
chose to employ a “hands off” attitude to the situation, an idea that would soon have to be 
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corrected.  As the oil representatives packed and prepared to leave for their October 8 
meeting, Sadat surprised the world and invaded Israel.25
                                                





Chapter 6: October 1973- “We knew everything but 




In early October 1973, the vast majority of attention in the United States of both 
the public and the government was focused on the scandal that was rapidly unraveling 
Nixon and his administration.  The saga of Watergate dominated the headlines and 
nightly news reports and enveloped the nation.  Entering into October, Nixon was chiefly 
concerned about the ruling on his appeal to prevent the release of seven Watergate-
related tapes to Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox who was in charge of the Watergate 
investigation.  Anticipating that he would receive an unfavorable ruling ordering their 
release, Nixon feared that their contents would lead to calls for him to step down from the 
presidency, or for formal articles of impeachment to be discussed.  In an effort to calm 
his critics, he decided to release summaries of the tapes, which he prepared from his 
home in Florida.2   
 Thus when Sadat launched his invasion of Israel on October 6, Yom Kippur, 
Judaism’s holiest day, Nixon was preparing the summaries in Florida, not in Washington 
overseeing the response to the conflict.  The attack took him completely by surprise.  
Despite the intelligence capabilities of the United States, no one had seen the attack 
coming, and therefore no one had warned the president about it.  Nixon himself had 
become so preoccupied with his domestic turmoil involving Watergate and the 
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developing scandal surrounding his vice president Spiro Agnew that it became 
impossible for him to fully concentrate on foreign affairs and diplomacy. 
 To add to the reasons for Nixon’s preoccupation during October 1973, three days 
after the war began Spiro Agnew met with Nixon to announce his resignation over an 
income tax violation.  This only added to Nixon’s domestic attention, as he now had to 
find a replacement or face the prospect of the line of presidential succession going to the 
Speaker of the House, a Democrat.  This situation, along with Watergate and the media 
firestorm surrounding it, prevented Nixon from giving his full weight and influence to the 
war in the Middle East.  While he did meet with Kissinger on occasion, he in essence left 
complete control of the U.S. response to others.  Nixon’s biggest presidential problem 
was dealing with the war, but his biggest personal problems were selecting a new vice 
president and avoiding the demands by the Special Prosecutor for the Watergate tapes.3  
Nixon chose to focus the majority of his efforts on his personal problems, and not in 
doing his duty as president.   
His newly appointed Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was more than willing 
to take command of the situation and operate and make decisions in the international 
arena while Nixon sat on the sidelines.  After Kissinger received word of theattack, he 
waited two and a half hours to inform Nixon.  In the intermediate time, he contacted the 
Israelis, Soviets, Syrians, the United Nations, Egyptians, and Jordanians.  Kissinger acted 
as if consulting with the President of the United States was a low priority, as even when 
he called down to Florida, he did not ask to speak with Nixon but rather with Al Haig, 
Nixon’s chief of staff.  This was part of a pattern that persisted throughout the crisis, a 
                                                




dismissal of Nixon’s role in dealing with the Yom Kippur War.  Kissinger justified his 
actions by later writing, 
 It was not clear that Nixon retained enough authority to manage the manifold  
pressures about to descend on him.  But we could not sit on the sidelines if the 
Middle East should rage out of control; the world would view it as a collapse of 
American authority, whatever alibi we put forward.  We had to protect our 
country’s ability to play its indispensable role as the guarantor of peace and the 
repository of the hopes of free peoples.4    
 
Nixon’s lack of attention to the Middle East, caused by both his domestic turmoil 
and by his focus on other foreign affairs prior to October 1973 in the Soviet Union, 
China, and Vietnam, contributed to U.S.’s lack of preparation for the war.  As the CIA 
and other intelligence agencies scrambled to figure out what was going on in the Middl
East and why they had not predicted Sadat’s plans, Kissinger scrambled to initia e
diplomacy without the President of the United States. 
Blind Intelligence 
 
The failure of the intelligence agencies to foresee the war continued up until the 
launching of the attack.  From June through September 1973 both Egypt and Syria called 
up large numbers of reserves and engaged in major military exercises.  However, both the 
Americans and Israelis saw “these activities as merely more realistic exercises.”5  On 
September 28, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who still had close ties to the 
Egyptians despite Sadat’s expulsion of the Soviet experts, warned Nixon at a White 
House meeting that, “We could all wake up one day and find there is a real conflagration 
in that area.”6  On September 30, Kissinger, alarmed by a report that Syrian tanks were 
massing near the Golan Heights, ordered a review of intelligence from the area.  The 
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State Department’s intelligence agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 
provided Kissinger a briefing in the vein of all the others, reading “In our view, the 
political climate in the Arab states argues against a major Syrian military move against 
Israel at this time.”7 
Other intelligence agencies repeated the same message: that an Arab-launched 
attack against Israel was highly unlikely.  The CIA issued a briefing on September 30 that 
Sadat’s activities since the spring “had been in the direction of bringing moral, political, 
and economic force to bear on Israel in tacit acknowledgement of Arab unreadiness to 
make war.”8  On October 3, an Israeli foreign ministry official concluded that Egyptian 
military maneuvers were “routine” and that the “voice of reason” would prevail in 
Damascus as well.9  The United States’ military intelligence arm, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, also stated on October 3, “The movement of Syrian troops and 
Egyptian military readiness are considered to be coincidental and not designed to lead to 
major hostilities.”10  
On October 5, events in the Middle East took an ominous turn.  The news reached 
Washington that the Soviet Union had been airlifting all of its dependents out of Egypt 
and Syria, everyone except technical and military advisers.  This evacuation would only 
have been ordered if something major were about to occur.  However, both the U.S. and 
Israeli intelligence agencies misinterpreted this too.  The CIA stated, “Rumors and agent 
reports may be feeding the uneasiness that appears to be developing.  The military 
preparations that have occurred do not indicate that any party intends to initiate 
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hostilities.”11  The Israelis echoed this; “Our assessment is that the alert measures being 
taken by Egypt and Syria are in part connected with maneuvers (as regards Egypt) and in 
part due to fears of offensive actions by Israel.  We consider the opening of military 
operations against Israel by the two armies as of low probability.”12  
All of the U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies incorrectly judged the blossoming 
situation in the Middle East.  There was a tremendous amount of groupthink among the 
agencies, where each blindly accepted the evaluations of the others and melded into their
own assessments.  No one agency could get past the idea that Egypt and Syria would 
launch an assault, and therefore they interpreted intelligence to prove it.  Kissinger writes 
of the colossal failure, “What no one believed…was that the Arabs would act on it.  Our 
definition of rationality did not take seriously the notion of starting an unwinnable war to 
restore self-respect.  There was no defense of our own preconceptions or those of our 
allies.”13  
The failure is most clearly seen in the dismissal of the Soviet airlift of its 
dependents out of Egypt.  This action was not typical, planned, or easily explained, and 
only would have come if there were a looming military crisis, and not solely a political 
one.  Emergency airlifts are done to work against a deadline, and the only logical 
deadline would be the opening of hostilities involving the nation the people were airlift d 
from.  Yet with all of this information, neither the Israelis nor Americans could p l 
themselves from their core belief that war in the Middle East was not imminent.  This 
misjudgment was “inexplicable” according to Kissinger, and represented a “r al failure 
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on the eve of the Mideast war.”14  All the intelligence agencies and key policymakers 
were guilty of this mischaracterization and misinterpretation.  Kissinger later summed up 
the situation; “We had become too complacent about our own assumptions.  We knew 
everything but understood too little.  And for that the highest officials- including me- 
must assume responsibility.”15 
One of the main reasons why the United States did not foresee the oil embargo 
was because they did not see a Middle East war coming.  As Nixon said later, “The news 
of the…attack on Israel took us completely by surprise.”16  While they did not believe oil 
and politics could be effectively linked, they failed to even see a situation wherethey 
could be connected, such as with a war.  Despite an incredible amount of information 
from a plethora of sources, all of the relative intelligence agencies and top policymakers 
refused to believe that war in the Middle East were imminent.  Because of this failure, the 
United States did not have a plan to deal with an oil shortage that might come as a result 
of war, and were therefore unprepared to deal with an embargo. 
The Arab Advance and Failed Oil Negotiations 
 
As the intelligence agencies attempted to get a handle on the evolving situation in 
the Middle East, Sadat and the Arabs were advancing quickly into Israeli territory.  They 
had caught Israel completely off guard, and in the first few days of the war scored 
significant victories.  The Egyptians succeeded in knocking out key Israeli defenses, 
destroying command posts, aerial combat headquarters, air defense and jamming centers, 
missile batteries and gun emplacements in the first air strike alone.  Sadat wrote about 
this in glowing terms.  “With this admirable air strike, the Egyptian Air Force recovered 
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all it had lost in the 1956 War and the 1967 defeat, and paved the way for our armed 
forces subsequently to achieve that victory which restored the self-confidence of our 
armed forces, our people, and our Arab nation.”17    
Massive amounts of Israeli munitions had been destroyed, and four days into the 
war the Soviets began to re-supply the Arabs with military equipment.  With the prospect 
of a quick Israeli victory gone (as many policymakers had felt would occur), the U.S. 
decided to re-supply Israel with munitions, hoping to stem the Arabs’ ever-increasing 
chances of winning.  The idea of sending U.S. supplies to Israel was dangerous to U.S. 
petroleum interests, as it risked provoking the Arabs to use their oil weapon.  However, 
Nixon threw his entire weight behind the idea and pledged to take full responsibility for 
any retribution sent from the Arabs, stating, “I told Kissinger that I would take full 
responsibility for the politics.”18  Kissinger felt that the U.S. should send only three 
planes, so as not to anger the Arabs as much, but Nixon refused, telling him, “Use every 
one we have.  Tell them [Defense Department] to send everything that can fly.”19 When 
the Israelis were able to regroup from the initial Arab attacks and after rec iving U.S. 
supplies, they began turning the tide and retaking key positions.  This shift created the 
pretext for the imposition of the oil embargo.20 
During the early stages of the war while the Arabs were winning decisively, th  
members of OAPEC did not see the need to employ their oil weapon.  However, when 
conditions for them deteriorated and a stalemate began to emerge, their position changed.  
The oil ministers of OAPEC had met with the representatives of the oil companies in 
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Vienna to discuss a price increase as the war was in its initial stages.  The meeting had 
been scheduled before the commencement of hostilities, but the events in the Middle East 
strengthened OAPEC’s bargaining position.  Also aiding their goal of a higher take for 
their oil was the overall oil shortage on the market and the quickly rising inflatio  that 
was present throughout the world.  OAPEC demanded a doubling of the price, while the 
representatives countered with an offering of a fifteen percent hike.  Unable to settle on a 
price, the talks broke down and at the same time, OAPEC called a meeting in Kuwaitto 
discuss an oil embargo.21   
Frustrated by both the breakdown in negotiations with the oil companies and the 
worsening situation of the Arab armies, OAPEC (with other members of OPEC) 
announced an immediate unilateral seventy percent hike in the price of oil.22  Also, on 
October 17, OAPEC issued a declaration aimed at stopping Israeli military success and 
punishing the United States, stating, 
each Arab oil exporting country [should] immediately cut its oil production by  
rate not less than 5% from the September production level, and further increase of 
5% from each of the following months, until such a time as the international 
community compels Israel to relinquish occupied Arab lands, and to levels that 
will not undermine their economies or their Arab obligations.23 
With the price hike and the oil production cut in place, King Faisal, the U.S. stalwart ly, 
shocked the West and imposed a ten percent cut of his own, followed quickly by a twenty 
percent cut and finally a complete embargo of oil to the United States by October 20.24  
OAPEC’s message, and Saudi Arabia’s, was clear: those who are friendly to the Arabs 
would be supplied with oil; those who were not would be embargoed until they 
capitulated to Arab demands against Israel.  Faisal publicly stated the extent that he was 
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willing to go to with the embargo; “Saudi Arabia will continue indefatigably placing all 
its resources at the service of higher Arab aims and of the protection and strengthening of 
this solidarity.”25 
 Countries that fell into the “friendly” category and would be supplied with oil at 
pre-embargo levels included Britain, France, Spain, and much of Europe except the 
Netherlands.  As King Faisal put it, “When they have been served then whatever was l ft 
might be distributed to the rest of the world.”26  “Unfriendly” countries, those that would 
receive no oil, included the U.S., the Netherlands, Japan, and Canada.27  These were the 
countries who were the most supportive of Israel or those whom the Arabs believed could 
exert influence on the U.S. to in turn pressure Israel.28 
The Nations Respond to the Embargo 
 
 The countries deemed as “unfriendly” to Arab interests scrambled to cope with 
the immediate reduction in their energy supplies.  Japan was heavily reliant on oil fr m 
the Middle East, and was shocked that they were included in the unfriendly list because 
they supported U.N. Resolution 242 that advocated the Israeli withdrawal from areas 
occupied after the 1967 war.  To appease the Arabs, Japan called for Israel to withdraw 
from larger amounts of territory than the resolution called for, advocated Palestini n elf-
determination, and threatened to reconsider its relationship with Israel if Israel did not 
agree to the terms.  In addition, Japan announced the first of several diplomatic missions 
to the Middle East by high-ranking government officials, where large amounts of aid 
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were promised, estimated at up to $3.3 billion.  Because of the dramatic shift in their
foreign policy position, Japan was granted “friendly” status late in 1973.29 
 Even those so-called “friendly” states were pushed to action by the embargo.  The 
United Kingdom, frightened that an embargo on other countries might have a ripple 
effect in the global market and cause a supply disruption, moved to ensure their favored 
status.  They immediately imposed an arms embargo on both sides of the conflict, a 
critical move against Israel because roughly half of Israel’s tanks were British-made.  
They also refused to allow U.S. planes to use British airbases during their re-supply of 
Israel.  Finally, the British declared that they would not sell any oil to the Netherlands, 
who was an outspoken critic of the Arab invasion, and halted all joint European efforts 
aimed at efficient oil sharing.30  These actions, meant to ensure supply, were widely seen 
as bowing to Arab pressure.  The British foreign secretary responded to this claim with a 
disavowal.  “There has been a great deal of talk recently about submission to Arab 
blackmail…The Arabs have made no demand on us and we have offered no price.”31  
While officials disregarded the public skepticism, it was clear that by adopting a more 
balanced stance on the war, Britain’s oil supplies were steadily becoming more assured.32  
As the Sunday Times in London observed, “Britain’s oil is safe- if we behave 
ourselves.”33 
 This uncoordinated approach by individual nations to secure their own oil supply 
by bowing to Arab threats made it difficult for the U.S. to put diplomatic pressure on the 
Arabs at the beginning of the embargo.  By offering to trade weapons, technology, and 
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aid for access to oil, European nations and Japan threatened to weaken alliances with the 
U.S. and hampered efforts by the U.S. to stabilize the situation in the Middle East.34  
However, the United States did not have a plan in place to deal with a direct oil embargo 
or with a global oil market where prices were skyrocketing due to other countries’ frantic 
efforts to secure supply.  As U.S. citizens became aware of OPEC’s production cuts, 
questions began to be asked of the White House on the matter.  Without a cohesive plan 
for coping with the cuts, Kissinger told Press Secretary Ron Ziegler that the U.S. could 
“handle it.”35  He went on to explain to Ziegler, “I know that is a token thing but if you 
say it’s a token thing that will force [OPEC] to escalate it.  Let’s say you’re aware of it.  
Isn’t it possible for us in effect to say in this delicate phase we don’t think any useful
purpose is served by it?”36  Instead, the government publicly focused on diplomatic 
initiatives that they hoped would avert any real supply problems or disruptions for 
domestic consumers.37  Kissinger, in particular, wanted to get through peace negotiations 
with the Arabs and Soviets before dealing with the oil embargo.38  
America Meets the Embargo 
  
In late October a United Nations-backed ceasefire was agreed to in the Middle
East and Kissinger was employing shuttle diplomacy to attempt to reach a disengagement 
of troops, but the embargo still remained in place.  Petroleum prices in the United States 
had stayed relatively level because of existing supply lines and although prices had yet to 
increase, Americans became much more informed of world events and the possible 
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consequences.39  A Time magazine article on the subject warned the embargo could 
“easily lead to cold homes, hospitals and schools, shuttered factories, slower travel, 
brownouts, consumer rationing, aggravated inflation and even worsened air pollution in 
the U.S.”40  When the embargo was imposed in the middle of October, Iran raised the 
price of its oil to $5.40 a barrel.  By November, Nigerian oil was being sold for more than 
$16 a barrel.41   
Even though the pain of shortages had not yet been felt by U.S. consumers many 
Americans began to grasp the reality that things would get worse very quickly.42  By late 
October, it became clear to policymakers that the U.S. would fall as much as ten perc nt 
behind its energy needs, and could be lacking as much as seventeen percent by winter 
depending on the weather.43  Nixon addressed these concerns in a national televised 
speech on November 7 in which he tried to convey the seriousness of the oil shortage but 
also to reassure the nation that it could be overcome.  “The fuel crisis need not mean 
genuine suffering for any American, but it will require sacrifice by all Americans.”44  He 
went on to outline a plan for coping with the supply problems, proposing more coal 
mining, fewer commercial airline flights, a 50-mile-per-hour national speed limit, the 
Alaska pipeline, more nuclear plants, car pooling, relaxed environmental restrictions, and 
for thermostats to be lowered to less than seventy degrees.  “We have an energy crisis, 
but there is no crisis of American spirit.”45 
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Americans were not used to being short of anything after World War II, but 
Nixon’s remarks at first did generate a united spirit of patriotism and sacrifice in the 
populace.  As newspaper headlines declared the worst, such as “Fuel Rationing” and 
“U.S. Controls by Spring,” many Americans seemed unfazed, or at least ready to accept 
the temporary hardship.46  In letters to the editor of the Los Angeles Times, some people 
saw the positive side of the embargo.  “So we live with an energy shortage.  Is there any 
real harm in being deprived of, say, half of our present energy consumption?  Better half 
now than a total failure 10 years hence.”47  In another a writer thanked the Arabs for their 
role in the embargo, claiming that “the Arab countries should be congratulated for 
contributing to the clean-air program in the world.”48  Nixon was also lauded by some for 
his efforts to combat the problem.  “President Nixon’s appeal for voluntary efforts to 
reduce national energy consumption has resulted in some encouraging initial 
responses…these prompt moves reflect a realistic understanding of the seriousness f th  
problem.”49 
The acceptance of the embargo by the American people, however, was not shared 
by all of the populace.  The continuing presence of the Watergate scandal led to many 
Americans feeling confused, not believing that such a thing could happen in the United 
States and wondering if perhaps the problem was engineered to distract the nation from 
Nixon’s dwindling support.50  Critics doubted that Nixon possessed the power to deal 
with the embargo, “The President’s response to the crisis demonstrates one of the 
problems he confronts if he is to recover from the Watergate scandals…critics are 
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charging that the President was slow to move on the energy question, that the 
Administration failed to do its homework on the problem soon enough.”51   In a report 
prepared for the Senate, the blame for the initial problem was put on the President for 
“eliminating oil import quotas too late” and the oil industry for “refusing to recognize for 
the last three years that a fuel shortage existed.”52 
The nation realized by the end of November that the crisis had the power to affect 
their lives.  Newspapers warned of the widespread power of an energy embargo would 
have a variety of businesses.53  People, fearing they would not be able to refuel their cars, 
began panic buying at the pumps, leading to spot shortages around the country.  Motorists 
waited in long lines for access to service stations, burning fuel in the process, and began 
topping off their tanks constantly.54  Gas prices soon doubled, but customers still backed 
up the entrances to stations, with some lines stretching four miles in New Jersey.55   
To deal with the constant demand, some stations began rationing their gas, but 
even with the limitations on buying, they ran out of product faster than refineries could 
ship them more gasoline.56  Anger among motorists soon became commonplace, and 
drivers frustrated by the lack of fuel and long lines vented on station attendants and each 
other, leading to fighting, stealing, even killing.  To attempt to discourage unnecessary 
driving, Nixon ordered service stations to close on Sundays and states began 
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implementing rationing programs.57  The New York Times recorded the result, “Millions 
of drivers, facing padlocked gas pumps and warnings of an energy crisis, kept their cars 
at home…many of the country’s major superhighways and parkways were barren.  There 
were cases, too, of those stranded without gas, of others siphoning fuel out of parked 
cars.”58   
Across the country citizens were forced to come face-to-face with the reality that 
the embargo brought, and with the fact that their behavior had to change.  Local 
governments ordered drivers of official cars to slow down while on the roads and 
provided bicycles as an alternative.  The speed limits on major turnpikes were reduc d 
and states mandated lower speed limits on roads under their control.  Field trips for public 
schools students were cancelled and public buses cut back on routes and schedules.  
Holiday light displays were trimmed back or cut out, and the governor of Oregon 
threatened to cut the electric service of anyone who defied his ban on outdoor lighting.  
Offices and factories changed their hours to use less artificial lighting, and some towns 
switched completely back to daylight savings time.  Thermostats were turned down, 
heating oil shipments were slowed and people were constantly barraged with the message 
that conservation was now essential.59 
Public anger soon grew from the newfound hardships caused by the embargo.  
Adding to the discontent, the major oil companies, buoyed by the rising price of oil, 
posted fourth-quarter profits that were 57 percent higher than just the previous year.60 
Widespread fury against the oil companies became common, and attacks against oil 
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delivery drivers and their trucks were reported throughout the country.61  Letters soon 
appeared in newspapers demonstrating the rising frustration toward Nixon and the oil 
companies.  “President Nixon’s immediate solution to the energy crisis is no soluti n at 
all…he has come up with nothing that an 8-year old school child couldn’t have come up 
with.  They aren’t even half-measures.”62  One called for the nationalization of the oil 
industry since, “such a course could hardly be worse than the impasse into which the oil 
companies and the Administration have led us.”63  Another wrote, “it is indeed too bad 
that this ‘energy crisis’ could not be used to achieve the real goal of energy conservation 
rather than merely accommodating the major oil companies and other giant corporate 
interests.”64  The top energy official in New York City called Nixon’s plan “short-sighted 
and inadequate.  It’s a disaster.”65  Truck drivers further escalated public frustration by 
blockading highways across the nation to protest increasing fuel costs and their 
decreasing profits.  One driver, who parked his truck on the Delaware Memorial Bridge 
to halt traffic, summed up his demands, “We want Nixon and his people, when they turn 
on their television sets, to hear us.”66  Another said, “The Great White Fathers back in 
Washington don’t [care] about truck drivers.  We’ve got to shut down this country to 
show ‘em what this is doing to us.”67 
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Some congressional representatives, spurred on by their constituents, called for 
hearings to determine if the oil companies were illegally manipulating the market.68  A 
newspaper editorial characterized the public perception,   
The result of all this is that the average American quite obviously is not persuaded 
that the “crisis” is for real.  The widespread supposition that the whole thing is a 
giant conspiracy by the big oil producers to push up prices and force out 
independent competition is no doubt a gross oversimplification, nurtured in part 
by the fact that Nixon scandals have made us all overly susceptible to conspiracy 
theories.  But certainly the inability of government to define the problem in 
specific terms has done nothing to allay these dark suspicions.69  
A Gallup poll taken during the embargo defined the differing opinions on whom the 
American public thought was to blame.  One quarter blamed the oil companies, another 
quarter blamed Nixon, and the rest blamed OPEC for beginning the crisis.70 
“Not Empty Threats” 71 
 
As the groundswell of anger and discontent grew among American citizens, there 
was no end in sight for the embargo.  While hostilities in the Middle East had subsided 
after a few weeks, the disengagement of troops on both sides was being feverishly 
negotiated by Kissinger and was not yet complete.  Stung by their losses and the
accompanying stalemate, OPEC and its allies continued the embargo.  When interviewed 
about the embargo, the erstwhile U.S. ally the Shah of Iran spoke plainly about where he 
expected the price of oil to go.  “Of course, it is going to rise!  Certainly!  And how!…I 
tell you, the price of oil must rise.  There’s no other solution…You make us pay more, 
scandalously more, for everything, and it’s only fair that, from now on, you should pay 
more for oil.  Let’s say…10 times more.”72   
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Without any clear timetable as to the conclusion of the embargo and without an 
adequate plan to deal with it for the foreseeable future, key policymakers in the U.S. 
Government began contemplating a plan that only months before would have seemed like 
a worst possible scenario; they seriously considered invading the Middle East to en ure 
that oil would be available to the United States.  Caught completely off guard by the war 
and the ensuing embargo, the idea of a Mideast invasion of the region around Saudi 
Arabia gained traction as the negotiations for withdrawal dragged on. 
From the early days of the Yom Kippur War, Defense Secretary James 
Schlesinger led the push for invasion.  Just four days into the war on October 10, 
Schlesinger approached Kissinger with the idea.  Schlesinger told Kissinger, “So I think 
we are going to get into a position in which all of our interests in Saudi Arabia are at risk 
and it might be desirable to examine the fundamentals of our position.”73  When asked 
what the fundamentals were, Schlesinger responded, “Well, the fundamentals are that w  
may be faced with the choice that lies, cruelly, between support of Israel and loss of
Saudi Arabia, and if interests in the Middle East are at risk, the choice between 
occupation or watching them go down the drain.”74  When Kissinger asked what 
countries would be occupied Schlesinger told him, “That would remain to be seen- it can 
be partial.”75   
Shortly after that conversation and with a permanent ceasefire still in doubt, 
Schlesinger began canvassing the idea to other officials because he wanted to esure that 
oil kept flowing from the region if an oil shutdown occurred.  Kissinger bluntly told him 
that diplomacy and negotiations would continue, and that, “I don’t think there is any need 
                                                
73 Kissinger, Crisis, 169. 
74 Ibid., 169. 




to consider occupation of anything at this time.”76  Despite Kissinger’s refusal to discuss 
an invasion, the idea made it into print in October in an article written by a well-known 
Pentagon defense adviser.  In the article Edward Luttwak argued for an immediate 
buildup of Western military forces in the Middle East to safeguard the oil supplies.  “A 
western military presence will be more effective in securing the flow of oil than political 
measures, which are unlikely to affect the internal situation in the oil-producing 
countries.”77   
With both Schlesinger and Kissinger posturing for control of the situation- 
Kissinger preferred diplomacy because he was in command of the State Department nd 
Schlesinger wanted a military solution because he headed the Defense Department- 
Kissinger asked for the help of one of Nixon’s top advisors, Chief of Staff Alexand r 
Haig, to help keep Schlesinger from getting what he wanted.  Haig told Kissinger that 
Schlesinger had already approached him with the idea of sending troops to the Trucial 
States78 to get access to oil wells.79  Kissinger told Haig, “He [Schlesinger] is insane.  I 
do not think we can survive with these fellows in there at Defense- they are crazy…Will 
you please help me with him?”80 
Without a diplomatic solution to the embargo, the idea of sending U.S. forces into 
the Middle East began to be floated in more direct ways.  On November 21 Kissinger at a 
press conference spoke of “Arab pressure” and an “Arab shutdown of oil” and said the 
U.S. would not change its policies due to the embargo and went so far as to warn of 
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“counter-measures” against oil producers.81  He ended his remarks by stating, “We would 
do this with enormous reluctance, and we are still hopeful that matters will not reach this 
point.”82  Only a week later Schlesinger announced that the United States would maintain 
a strategic naval presence in the Indian Ocean that was aimed at protecting American 
interests in the Gulf amid fears brought on by the October War and the embargo.83   
The Arabs stepped up their rhetoric against the thinly veiled threats in the days 
after these public statements.  Saudi Arabia’s oil minister, Sheikh Yamani said that the 
Arab states “could cut production by 80 percent” if the United States attacked and 
suggested that Saudi Arabia might blow up its oil infrastructure if invaded.84  The 
Algerian president also warned against such provocation, “if the West tries to act with 
arrogance or to use force, it would suffer a catastrophe.  All of the wells will be set on 
fire, all the pipelines will be destroyed and the West will pay the price.”85 
While such bluster from both sides could easily be dismissed as being made for 
domestic consumption only, the idea of the U.S. invading the Middle East was gaining 
legitimacy and proponents within the Nixon Administration.  Kissinger turned awayfrom 
his early repulsion to the idea, stating that his words on November 21 reflected a new 
reality.  “These were not empty threats.  I ordered a number of studies from the key 
departments on countermeasures against Arab members of OPEC if the embargo 
continued.  By the end of the month, several contingency studies had been completed.”86  
Plans for an invasion gained such prominence that the U.S. even brought up the subject 
                                                
81 Marwan Buheiry, U.S. Threats of Intervention Against Arab Oil: 1973-1979 (Beirut, Lebanon: Institute 
for Palestine Studies, 1980), 11. 
82 Kissinger, Years, 880. 
83 New York Times, Dec. 1, 1973, 1. 
84 International Herald Tribune, Nov. 22, 1973- quoted in Buheiry, U.S. Threats, 11. 
85 International Herald Tribune, Dec. 5, 1973- quoted Buheiry, U.S. Threats, 11-12. 




with its allies.  On November 15 Schlesinger met with the British ambassador to the 
United States, Lord Cromer, and discussed the Middle East war and its aftermath, and 
told him “that it was no longer obvious to him that the United States could not use 
force.”87 
This statement was not made publicly but in confidence to a key U.S. ally, and 
was not meant to drum up public support.  Although Schlesinger did not elaborate, the 
British took his remarks in step with Kissinger’s press conference on November 21 and
reached the conclusion that there was a high probability that the United States was 
preparing for invasion.  While specific military plans were not shared with the British, 
their Joint Intelligence Committee began to compile a report analyzing what they hought 
the United States might do.  This lengthy and detailed process would not have been 
undertaken had the British Government not believed that there was a great possibility of 
American military action against the Middle East.88 
This classified report, entitled “Middle East- Possible Use of Force by the United 
States” was sent to the British Prime Minister Edward Heath on December 13, 1973.  In it 
the Joint Intelligence Committee theorizes that the U.S. did not want to attack the Middl  
East, “But…the U.S. could be faced with a choice between coercion of Israel and the use
of force against the Arabs.”89  The report stated that the U.S. would have three options for 
dealing with the embargo: pressuring Israel to withdraw from their presently occupied 
Palestinian lands that they had held since the 1967 Six Day War, attacking Egypt and 
possibly Syria, or seizing oil-producing areas.  The first choice was unlikely because 
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Israel was a strategic U.S. ally in the region, and the second option was feared to spur a 
confrontation with the Soviet Union and “would lead at once to a total stoppage of Arab 
oil supplies to the West.”90  The third option, the seizing of oil-rich areas, seemed to be 
the most likely.  The Joint Intelligence Committee noted that, “We regard this as the 
possibility uppermost in American thinking when they refer to the use of force; it has 
figured in U.S. thinking in the past, and has been reflected, we believe, in their 
contingency planning.”91  
If the United States were to launch an invasion of the Middle East, the “dark 
scenario,” according to the British, it would be because of “intensified and protracted oil 
restrictions.”92  Since the United States was not prepared for the embargo and lacked a 
plan for allocating tight oil supplies in an emergency, they would go to war in order t 
prevent the U.S. economy from being seriously crippled, as would already be happening 
in Europe and Japan if the embargo dragged on.  “Although the U.S. economy would 
itself be less directly affected than other Western economies (the Arab embargo only 
affects 17% of U.S. oil imports) it would be suffering from the general effects of world 
recession and U.S. interests generally would be threatened.”93  The need of the economy 
to end the embargo “would be so serious that the U.S. Government would be prepared to 
face the consequences of military intervention against the Arabs.”94  These potential 
consequences included a military confrontation against the Soviet Union, the prospect of 
a long occupation of Arab territories and the alienation of all Arabs, the alienation of 
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most Third World countries, dissension within the United States, and the risk of harm to 
U.S. citizens in the Middle East.95   
The British Joint Intelligence Committee agreed with Secretary Schlesing r in 
that an occupation of the Middle East need only be partial.  “Since the United States 
would be intervening in defence of its wider rather than its purely domestic interests, it 
would be necessary to secure oilfields sufficient at least to meet the needs of the United 
States, Western Europe and Japan.”96  The British calculated this need to be 760 million 
tons in 1973.  The Arab countries that could most easily meet this need and pose the least 
problems for shipment out the region were Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi.  “If the 
installations of these three countries were seized, the United States would then control 
proven oil reserves” of 28.4 thousand million tons.97   
The British report went so far as to examine the precise military plans that they 
theorized the Americans would use.  “We believe that the American preference would be 
for a rapid operation conducted by themselves to seize oilfields” because this would 
reduce resistance offered by the Arabs, reduce probable casualties, and allow the U.S. to 
negotiate from a position of strength.98  The American presence in the region would not 
necessarily have to be overwhelming. 
The initial force need not be large.  The force used to seize airfields, other 
strategic points and the main oil installations could be reinforced rapidly by airlift 
from the United States.  We estimate that the force required for the initial 
operation would be of the order of two brigades, one for the Saudi operation, one 
for Kuwait; and possibly a third for Abu Dhabi.99 
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Despite the relatively small force that could be used to seize the area, the Americans 
would be forced to commit themselves to the region long-term if they invaded. 
Apart from the need to control oilfields producing a sufficient quantity, it would 
be essential to ensure their continued protection against counter-attack.  The area 
would have to be securely held, probably for a period of some ten years to give 
time for the West to develop alternative energy supplies.  Occupation forces 
would be needed.100 
The fact that the British judged the situation in the Middle East and the comments 
by American officials to be leading to a U.S. invasion underscores the dire situation the 
United States was in.  They were completely unprepared for the oil embargo and its 
effects on the U.S. economy and when the Arabs imposed and stuck to it, they seriously 
considered drastic measures that would have dramatic international and long-term 
ramifications.  Sadat and his scheming completely confused the Americans and bec use 
they did not see the war in the Middle East coming, they did not see the oil embargo 
either, despite constant warnings from numerous credible sources.   
With Nixon preoccupied by Watergate and other officials effectively running U.S. 
foreign policy, the U.S. did not see the convergence of tensions in the Middle East and 
the breakdown of the negotiations between the oil producers and the oil companies, and 
what it all could lead to.  Once the embargo was in place, Japan and Western European 
nations scrambled to curry favor with the Arabs and secure their own oil supplies. 
Without their own plan for strategically allocating oil during an emergency shutoff, the 
U.S. tried to unilaterally convince the Arabs to lift the embargo.  When that proved 
difficult and when the American public was forced to change their daily lives becaus  of 
the embargo, the U.S. government entertained prospects for an invasion that just month  
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Conclusion: “We had to stop depending on crude oil for 
economic growth. We had to wean ourselves away.”1 
 
The contemplated invasion of the Middle East by the United States never came to 
fruition because, by the end of March 1974, the embargo was officially lifted.  After
months of “shuttle diplomacy” between Israel and the Arab nations, Kissinger 
constructed an agreement that would bring about a peaceful separation of the respective 
militaries on the Israeli-Syrian front.  This, in addition to the progress made toward 
disengagement on the Egyptian front, propelled moderate Arab leaders such as Faisal to
agree to end the embargo.  Coupled with the fact that oil from OPEC nations was 
sneaking on to the market in greater quantities, the embargo became less and le 
effective and the OPEC nations voted on March 18 to end the embargo, with only Syria 
and Libya dissenting. 
 The oil weapon had been sheathed, but the embargo left harsh effects on the 
American economy and mindset.  Kissinger, in a speech in 1975, recalled the damage 
done by the embargo on both economic and political fronts, 
The oil embargo, coupled with OPEC price increases, cost Americans half a 
million jobs and over $10 billion in national output.  It added at least 5 percentage 
points to the price index, contributing to the worst inflation since World War II.  
Partly because of their greater dependence on Middle East oil, our principal allies 
in Western Europe and Japan separated from us over Middle East policy in the 
most serious strain in our alliances since they were founded.2  
 
Despite the negative effects on the economy, the embargo had in some ways failed in its 
mission to deprive the U.S. of oil.  Diversion of oil from other producers to the U.S. and 
black market leakage of OPEC oil led to only a loss of 450 thousand barrels daily in 
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December, a seven percent loss of imports and only 2.4 percent of total supply.3  
Nonetheless, even without the massive reduction in U.S. oil stockpiles, the embargo 
inflicted great hardship on many Americans, and the idea of the embargo was in many 
ways worse than the embargo itself.  The idea of embargo shattered the American myth 
of imperviousness.  No longer could Americans reasonably believe that they were 
insulated from problems in the Middle East, and they could no longer believe that the 
U.S. was completely in control of the region. 
The United States faced “a substantial long-run national problem”4 
 
 The dependence of the U.S. on the Middle East for oil created a great 
vulnerability, the Achilles’ heel of the U.S. economy.  This vulnerability had been 
ignored for decades by U.S. officials who had blindly passed off influence in the region
to oil companies, ignored the formation of a producers’ cartel in OPEC, refused to 
formulate a cohesive energy plan to deal with emergencies, failed to recognize how oil 
and politics could be linked, and misinterpreted or turned a blind eye toward clear signs 
that a Middle East war was coming and that oil could be used as a weapon.  Things had 
changed dramatically in the region after the embargo, and the U.S. would no longer be 
allowed to set the terms of interactions, both diplomatic and economic. 
The embargo was a wake up call in the mid-1970s for America.  Some scholars 
immediately recognized that times had changed and America needed to change with it.  
As one economist pointed out, 
Along with the economic uncertainties of growing dependence means increased 
vulnerability in both dimensions, and the political may well be more significant 
than the economic.  What might have been said about the political effect as late as 
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September [1973] is no longer necessary: they are unrolling before our eyes.  We 
will probably go to considerable lengths to prevent them from happening again.5 
 
With the embargo over some began openly advocating for the “dark scenario” 
contemplated by the U.S. during the embargo- an invasion and takeover of oil-producing 
regions- to become a reality.  In the March 1975 issue of Harper’s, Miles Ignotus laid out 
the case for seizing Arab oil fields.6  After dismissing the nonviolent solutions to 
breaking OPEC’s market power, he said,  
There remains only force.  The only feasible countervailing power to OPEC’s 
control of oil is power itself- military power…The goal is not just to seize some 
oil but to break OPEC.  Thus force must be used selectively to occupy large and 
concentrated oil reserves…If we will not do it, future generations will see throug  
our protestations of moral restraint and recognize craven passivity.7  
  
While the idea of invasion was dismissed during the 1970s, the public outcry was 
such that explanations for the crisis were sought and changes enacted to attempt to 
prevent an embargo from ever happening again.  As Jimmy Carter later wrote of the 
public mood, many Americans, “deeply resented that the greatest nation on earth was 
being jerked around by a few desert states.”8  Senate hearings were held and oil company 
executives subpoenaed to testify, and grilled publicly to the delight of many citizens.9  
Energy conservation programs were instituted within the United States to save fuel and 
find new sources of domestic energy production, including fuel efficiency standards for 
motor vehicles in 1975 and the production of the Alaskan pipeline.  Jimmy Carter 
campaigned for the presidency with a national energy policy as one of his chief goals, 
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and promised one within 90 days of taking office.  The Department of Energy was 
formed in 1977 to seek that end, and James Schlesinger, formerly the Defense Secretary, 
was given the top post in the new department.10  Schlesinger stated plainly what he saw 
as a “substantial long-run national problem.  We had to stop depending on crude oil for 
economic growth.  We had to wean ourselves away.”11 
The calls for decreased dependence on foreign oil, brought on by high prices, 
began disappearing by the end of 1978.  As new energy policies took hold in the United 
States and abroad, new supplies of oil began appearing on the market.  The high prices, 
brought on by the energy crunch and the embargo, gave a powerful incentive to 
entrepreneurs to search for new petroleum reserves.  Massive new oil fields were 
discovered in Alaska, Venezuela, and the North Sea.  When these fields began producing, 
prices for crude oil fell and the public clamor for change fell.  Americans again fell into 
the role of accepting cheap oil as a natural way of life. 
Legacy 
 
The legacy of the 1973 Arab oil embargo is one of mixed results.  There was a 
definite lack of preparation within the United States to deal with such a crisis, brought on 
by a multitude of reasons and hubris, and the process of correcting those mistakes has 
yielded both positive and negative results.  When the United States came face-to-f c  
with its vulnerability brought about by its dependence on imported oil and encountered 
hardships for the first time because of it, a number of changes were enacted.  
Conservation and new exploration programs were initiated, some of which are presently 
still in use, public officials and oil companies were blamed for their lack of foresight and 
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manipulation, and the need for closer, direct connections with the Arab nations were 
recognized.  This new relationship would be between governments, without the buffer of 
the oil companies that had previously been in place.  Kissinger spoke of this new, 
dramatically different, relationship in a speech, 
The United States cannot, and will not, entrust its political and economic destiny 
to decisions made elsewhere.  At the same time we are ready to seek a new 
relationship with the oil-producing nations.  We ought to be partners, not 
adversaries…We are ready to cooperate with the oil producers in linking our 
economies on equitable terms.12 
 
The embargo fundamentally changed the way the U.S. viewed the economic power of the 
Arabs.  No longer were the Arabs the perpetual supplicants, but were now viewed on a 
more equitable basis.  The oil companies that had controlled the region for so long with 
the consent of the U.S. would no longer have the influence they once did, and the U.S. 
would not allow itself to be as detached from the region as it was before 1973. 
Since the embargo the U.S. has sought to maintain even closer watch on the 
Middle East and build tighter economic and political ties with Arab nations that are 
friendly to U.S. interests, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  This has also led to 
intervention against regimes that were unfriendly to U.S. interests, as in the 1991 Gulf 
War against Iraq, and action against the U.S. such as the Iranian hostage crisis which 
began in 1979 with the overthrow of the U.S.-backed Shah.  Since the 1973 embargo the 
U.S. has left open the possibility of military action against the Middle East, and acted to 
secure oil supplies and protect allies on several occasions.  The idea of the U.S. 
intervening militarily in the affairs of the Middle East to protect the access to oil comes 
directly from the crisis when that access was blocked.  
                                                




 Even with the realization by Americans that dependence on foreign oil brings
with it economic vulnerability and an increased likelihood of military action, Americans 
have continually stopped short of taking the actions necessary to eliminate that 
dependence.  With every sizable spike in oil prices there are new calls to conserve 
energy, new accusations against oil companies, renewed hostility toward oil producers, 
and new guarantees by officials that the present crisis will be the one to serve a  the 
impetus to wean the United States off of foreign oil once and for all, but all such 
movements have ended without solving the problem.  The U.S. has followed the same 
pattern time and again in dealing with rising oil prices, a pattern that originated in 1973 
and that is based upon a lack of preparation that has been in the making for a much longer 
period of time.  
 Although the 1973 Arab oil embargo has been greatly overshadowed by other 
major events of the period such as the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, it played 
a pivotal role in history and fundamentally changed U.S. policy and the mindset of 
Americans.  The U.S. has struggled with its dependence on oil, and therefore the Middle 
East, and has yet to come to a real solution for how to solve that dependency (or, at least 
one they were willing to implement).  Up until 1973 the U.S. was “living in a sort of 
fool’s paradise” when it came to its view toward oil and the Middle East, a paradise that 
was shattered by the embargo and has never quite been rebuilt.13  Perhaps the real lesson 
of the oil embargo can be summed by the words of a 1975 Senate report on the event, “In 
a sense this is the overriding lesson of the petroleum crisis- in a democracy, important 
questions of policy with respect to a vital commodity like oil, the lifeblood of an 
                                                




industrial society, cannot be left to private companies acting in accord with private 
interests and a closed circle of government officials.”14 
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